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Abstract 
The purpose of this thesis is to investigate the relation of value and size factor anomalies to the 
systematic risk of equities. Value and size effects are academically proven market anomalies that have 
existed on various markets and time periods. Value anomaly refers to the tendency of stocks trading at 
low price multiples, such as the price to book value of equity (P/B), to outperform stocks trading at 
higher price multiples. Size anomaly means the tendency of smaller market capitalization stocks to 
outperform larger market capitalization stocks. For example, Fama & French (1996) and Malkiel (2014) 
argue that these market anomalies rise from these investment types being exposed to larger than average 
risk, which would explain the abnormal returns. Because of this proposition, these anomalies are also 
called risk factors. Investment styles exploiting these anomalies are called factor investment strategies 
or “Smart Beta” strategies as branded by the investment industry. 
 
Factor investment strategies have become increasingly popular during recent years and there is a wide 
range of easily available investment vehicles such as ETF:s to employ these strategies. The goal of our 
research is to investigate if the value and size factor strategies carry with them a higher systematic risk 
than that of the market. This is done by making a set of regression analyses on the constituent stocks of 
the Standard & Poor’s 500-index. In the regressions we test for associations between beta and firm size 
and value factor proxies price-to-book, price-to-earnings, and dividend yield. Value factor proxies are 
investigated in separate regressions to avoid multicollinearity. The dataset is then further divided into 
industry sectors and separate regressions are made for each sector to explore for sector differences. The 
linkage of size effect into large cap S&P 500 stocks can be criticized but we find it relevant to investigate 
also this factor since the range of company sizes across S&P 500 is by any standards high, with 60-
month average market capitalizations ranging from 3 billion USD to 642 billion USD. We aim to answer 
the question if and how loading an investment portfolio with value or size factor tilts influences the 
level of systematic risk the portfolio is exposed to. 
 
Our empirical analysis finds that overall the factor proxies do not have an association to either increasing 
nor decreasing systematic risk. Price-to-earnings ratio, price-to-book ratio, and market capitalization do 
not have statistically or practically significant relation to beta. Dividend yield has a statistically and 
practically significant negative association with beta across S&P 500. However, this effect is not 
observed within separate sector regressions, indicating that the effect across S&P 500 might be caused 
by sector differences. In short, value and size factor investment strategies do not influence the level of 
systematic risk of a portfolio except if value factor is proxied by dividend yield, in which case it has a 
beta decreasing effect. 
Keywords      
Factor investing, beta, value investing, Smart Beta. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
Academic research has found systematic factors in the stock market which provide 
higher returns versus the overall market. Some of the most well documented of these 
factors are the Value and Size factors (Fama & French 1993; 1996). The purpose of 
this study is to research how these two factors are associated with the systematic risk 
of stocks. The study is based on data from S&P 500-indice stocks for the years 2013 
– 2018.  
Systematic risk is measured in the study by using the Beta-coefficient which is 
calculated by using data of the monthly stock and S&P 500 returns from the last 5 
years.  
The value factor is represented in the study by price-to-book (P/B), price-to-earnings 
(P/E), and dividend yield (DY) ratios. Size factor is represented by the market 
capitalizations of the companies. 
The motivation for this study comes from investigating the interaction of the Value 
and Size factors with the systematic risk of the market. Since the value and size 
anomalies are well documented and publicized, exploiting their excess returns is of 
interest to investors. For this purpose, there exists a large variety of mutual funds, 
exchange traded funds and investment strategies for picking individual stocks.  
The goal of this research is not to develop a comprehensive model for explaining and 
forecasting the determinants of beta, but to investigate specifically the possible relation 
of Value and Size factors to beta.  
Our research aims to find out whether loading an investment portfolio with these risk 
factors influences the portfolio’s exposure to the systematic risk of the market. This is 
important to know for mitigating unknown risks to the portfolio. If our regression 
analysis finds a positive relation with the risk factors and beta, it implies that adding 
investments with value and size factor exposures to a portfolio increases the portfolio’s 
systematic risk. Vice versa if the regression analysis shows a negative relationship with 
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these factors and beta, it indicates that adding the factors to a portfolio decreases its 
exposure to systematic risk.  
In our empirical analysis part, we conduct 72 separate regressions to investigate the 
relation of beta with the factor proxies. The number of regressions is large because we 
make separate regressions for the whole dataset, each MSCI GICS classified sector, 
and each factor proxy separately. The factor proxies are investigated in separate 
regressions to avoid multicollinearity between different value proxies (P/B, P/E, and 
DY). Accurate description of our data and econometric methodology is discussed in 
Chapter 5.  
This thesis continues in Chapters 2 and 3 by introducing systematic risk, the value and 
size factors, and previous research contributed on them. Chapter 4 focuses on previous 
research involving both beta and the risk factors. As mentioned, Chapter 5 is about our 
data and research methodology. Chapter 6 moves on to introduce our research 
hypotheses. Chapter 7 shows our empirical quantitative results and discussion about 
their implications. We conclude the research in Chapter 8 with a summary of our 
research and its results. Chapter 8 is followed by references and appendices.  
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2 SYSTEMATIC RISK OF EQUITIES 
This chapter introduces systematic risk of equities and one way of estimating it, 
through a beta coefficient. The chapter discusses academic research conducted on the 
usage, benefits, and problems of beta. The chapter is not comprehensive, but a brief 
introduction of the most important aspects. Further research on beta is discussed in 
chapter 4, where we investigate the theoretical and empirical relation of beta with the 
value and size factors.  
Beta coefficient is a measure which is purposed to represent the so-called systematic 
risk of a stock. The Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) divides the risk of a stock to 
firm-specific risk and systematic risk. Systematic risk describes the risk of how much 
the swings of overall market reflect to the value of a particular asset. If a stock carries 
a systematic risk similar to the average risk of the stock market in terms of volatility, 
the stock’s beta coefficient value is one. If the stocks riskiness is lower than that of the 
overall market, its beta is less than one, and a stock which carries a higher risk has a 
beta above one. A beta of zero implies that a stock carries no systematic risk, meaning 
that its price has no correlation with the movements of the overall market. A negative 
beta signifies that the stock tends to move oppositely to the market. Stocks with betas 
above one are considered aggressive, while stocks with betas less than one are 
considered defensive. Beta can be calculated also for a portfolio of securities by 
calculating the weighted average of the individual securities’ betas weighted by the 
portfolio allocations. (Kallunki, Martikainen & Niemelä, 2008: 76-77, 273-274.) 
The overall market is usually represented by a broad equity market index, such as the 
Standard & Poor’s 500. If beta is calculated for a company’s stock which is listed in 
another country than the United States it can alternatively be calculated by using that 
country’s local equity index. Equity markets around the world have however become 
increasingly correlated, which means that for example European stocks face 
systematic risk also from the downturns of the U.S. market, not just from the local 
conditions. This has somewhat diminished the effect of international equity 
diversification. Beta can also be calculated for other assets than equities, such as bonds 
or commodities. This is done to compare the correlations of different asset classes for 
diversification purposes. (Driessen & Laeven 2007; Estrada & Vargas 2012.)  
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Beta is calculated as the covariance between the asset and the market, divided by the 
variance of the market. 
β = 𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 (𝑟ₐ , 𝑟ₘ)  ÷ 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 ( 𝑟ₘ)  
Equation 1: Beta equation.  
Where β refers to Beta, rₐ refers to the return of the asset, and rₘ refers to the return of 
the market. (Rees, 1995, p. 166.) 
Since positive betas signify positive correlation with the stock market (S&P 500), 
investors experience diversification benefits from assets uncorrelated with the market, 
possessing zero betas. For example, hedge funds can try to create zero-beta portfolios, 
meaning that in theory they would provide returns regardless of the direction of the 
overall market. These market neutral portfolios are created by using both long and 
short positions, or by using arbitrage opportunities (Asness, Moskowitz & Pedersen, 
2013). Alternative asset classes are a usual source of claimed diversification benefits, 
but often even they are highly affected by downturns in U.S. equities, meaning that 
they have significantly positive betas (Leibowitz & Bova 2007). Gold is an example 
of an asset that is largely uncorrelated with the stock market, and its returns over a 
three-decade long period from the 1970s show a zero beta against the U.S. stock 
market (McCown & Zimmerman 2006). It must be remembered that results of Beta 
calculations for a security can experience large fluctuations depending on how long 
return intervals are used (Hawawini 1983).  
Beta coefficients of different industries have been found to vary significantly. Stocks 
of firms operating on industries which are more dependent on the economic cycle tend 
to possess higher betas. However, this effect is seen on averages of large samples, and 
the beta coefficients between members of a same industry group can also have a large 
variation. For a comprehensive listing of betas on different industries see Damodaran 
(2018).  
Because cyclical stocks tend to possess higher betas, it is useful to look at which 
industries are considered cyclical. An example of categorization can be seen in 
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Morningstar Global Equity Classification Structure, which divides industries into three 
Super Sectors; Cyclicals, Sensitives, and Defensives. Cyclicals, which are the most 
volatile industries comprise sub-sectors of Basic Materials, Consumer Cyclical, 
Financial Services, and Real Estate. Sensitives comprises of sectors, which are 
perceived to have average market risk; Communication Services, Energy, Industrials, 
and Technology. Defensives Super Sector is comprised of the industries which are the 
least affected by economic cycles; Consumer Defensive, Healthcare, and Utilities. 
(Morningstar Research, 2011) 
Betas of individual stocks have a tendency of regressing towards one from both sides. 
If a single stock is evaluated with calculating its beta over adjacent 5-year periods, the 
variation can be significant, meaning that the explanatory power of the previous 
period’s beta over the next period’s beta is quite low. This coefficient of determination 
for a single stock is only 0.36 (36%). This is caused to some extent by the stochastic 
behavior of security prices and by the changes in the firm’s operations during the time 
span. The low coefficient of determination for betas calculated on adjacent 5-year time 
periods improves greatly when betas are calculated for larger portfolios of stocks. The 
previous period’s beta for a portfolio of 50 stocks explains as much as 96% of the next 
period’s beta. Overall stocks which are indicated by beta to have an extremely high or 
extremely low systematic risk, tend to move towards a more average risk as time goes 
by. (Friend & Blume, 1970; Blume, 1975.) 
Capital Asset Pricing Model by Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965) suggests that stocks 
with high beta coefficients provide also higher than average returns. Fama & Macbeth 
(1973) find that this theory holds true on stocks listed in NYSE during the years 1928 
– 1968. However, on later years the beta – return relationship seems to have 
disappeared, which has been seen as an indication that beta is not an adequate measure 
for expected returns (Reinganum 1981, Lakonishok & Shapiro 1986, Fama & French 
1992). This observation has on its part affected to the research on other risk factors 
that possibly provide excess returns, such as value and size factors on equities. Fama 
& French (2004) provide a detailed discussion of the various feats and shortages of the 
CAPM, showing how empirical research has on many parts disproved the theory and 
set new models for asset pricing, such as the risk factors.  
10 
 
Contrary results to those of Fama & French have also been proposed in research, such 
as Elsas, El-Shaer & Theissen (2003) documenting statistically significant beta-return 
relationship in the German stock market, Isakov (1999) documenting the same effect 
in the Swiss stock market, and Morelli (2007) in the UK market.  
Fletcher (2000) investigates beta – return relationship in the stock markets of 18 
developed nations during years 1970 – 1998. An analysis of the full period results in 
a flat relationship between beta and return, consistent with Fama & French (1992). 
However, when Fletcher breaks the period into subperiods of up- and down-markets, 
beta – return relationship emerges. Higher beta boosts stock returns in up-markets and 
worsens the returns in down-markets. This is exactly the way beta is theoretically 
meant to function in CAPM. Contradictory to CAPM however, Fletcher does not find 
a significant beta – return relationship spanning across the subperiods. Fletcher’s 
results imply that in the long-run higher beta securities do not earn excess returns, but 
in the short-run they exaggerate the movements of the broader market in both 
directions.  
Reeb, Kwok & Baek (1998) show that Multinational Corporations (MNCs) are 
exposed to larger systematic risk than corporations operating only in the U.S. The 
results are surprising when considering that the beta in the study is calculated in 
relation to the U.S. market. Montgomery & Singh (1984) try to link beta to various 
corporate diversification strategies. They find that companies which operate on 
multiple unrelated lines of business show higher betas. Other types of companies (in 
terms of operational diversification) tend to have betas around the mean of the market. 
Estrada & Vargas (2012) take a non-conventional approach to evaluate the usefulness 
of Beta as a measure of portfolio’s systematic risk versus evaluating Betas on single 
stocks. Estrada & Vargas form high- and low-Beta portfolios from country and 
industry specific equity indexes, used widely by ETF-products. Their data consists 
from 47 countries and 57 industries during the years 1973 – 2009. The index Betas are 
calculated against the returns of the U.S. market. The research finds that low-Beta 
portfolios perform significantly better than high-Beta portfolios when the market is hit 
by a crisis (Estrada & Vargas use the term Black Swan, coined by Nassim Taleb). In 
the post-crisis recovery period, high-Beta portfolios outperform. Overall, the results of 
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Estrada & Vargas seem to imply that Beta is still a useful risk measure, at least on 
portfolio-level.  
De Carvalho, Lu & Moulin (2012) research five risk-based strategies in forming equity 
portfolios. They find that these quantitative strategies favor low-beta stocks and that 
low-beta stocks provide systematically higher returns than predicted by the CAPM. 
Christoffersen & Simutin (2017) show that pension fund managers respond to 
pressures of beating their benchmark by overweighting on high-beta stocks to 
capitalize on rising markets. They analyze that this might create overdemand for high-
beta stocks, which would at least partially explain why high-beta stocks underperform 
relative to the CAPM predictions. Blitz & Van Vliet (2007) show that low volatility 
stocks earn abnormal risk adjusted returns, and that during 1986 – 2006 this effect was 
present on U.S., Japanese, and European equity markets. Their results suggest that 
equity investors overpay for risky stocks versus more stable stocks. On average, lower 
volatility stocks tend to have also lower betas.  
Hänsel & Krahnen (2007) examine how issuing Collateralized Debt Obligations 
(CDO) affects the systematic risk of banks in U.S. and Europe. They find that issuing 
CDO’s raises the beta of the issuing bank, implying correctly that the bank is exposing 
itself to heightened market risk. In retrospect this is an interesting result, since credit 
securitization was one of the triggers for the financial crisis. According to the results 
of Hänsel & Krahnen it seems that the stock market was aware of the possible risks 
already before the start of the crisis. The study’s results support the role of beta as an 
adequate measure of systematic risk. Jorion (2009) also notes the failure of 
sophisticated value at risk (VAR) models to predict the crisis, making the Hänsel & 
Krahnen results even more relevant.  
Campbell, Polk & Vuolteenaho (2005) suggest that different types of stocks (Value 
and Growth, discussed more in Chapter 3) have different kinds of systematic risk, even 
though the traditional CAPM considers systematic risk to be similar in nature across 
all equities. Campbell et al. investigate the cash flow patterns of Growth versus Value 
stocks and find significant differences. Growth stock cash flows are negatively 
affected by short term shocks to the stock market, which originate from changing 
equity risk premiums. Conversely, Value stock cash flows are not affected by the 
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temporary shocks but are affected by permanent shocks to the stock market, which 
decrease cash flows of the entire market. The research of Campbell et al. implies that 
the accuracy of a stock’s beta as a measure of systematic risk is dependent of the 
prevalent market conditions and the type of the stock in the Value – Growth spectrum.  
Damodaran (1999) lists the three largest problems in using traditional regression betas 
for the purpose of estimating systematic risk for individual stocks. First, the market 
index against which the beta is regressed can be overwhelmingly dependent on the 
movement of just a few large stocks, which is especially true in many emerging 
markets. Second, the beta estimate can be noisy, meaning that it has large standard 
errors which in turn raises questions about accuracy. Third, the fundamental 
characteristics of the firm might have changed during the regression period, changing 
the exposure to systematic risk. Damodaran suggests a multistage calculation to first 
analyze the firm’s operating businesses and taking into account their leverage, i.e. 
unlevering betas, to produce a bottom-up beta, which should more accurately represent 
the stock’s systematic risk. We will discuss Damodaran’s suggestions and the usage 
of levered vs. unlevered Betas more in Chapter 5, where we explain our research 
methodology in detail. It must also be remembered, that beta relates the systematic risk 
of an individual security to the market but does not offer information of what risks the 
entire market is facing.  
Aside systematic risk, stocks carry also idiosyncratic, or firm specific risk. Kumar 
(2009) examines U.S. stocks which show lottery-like features. These are the riskiest 
stocks in the market featuring the largest volatility and uncertainty. Kumar constructs 
the lottery stock portfolio by identifying stocks with largest idiosyncratic volatility and 
skewness patterns in returns. On average these stocks are young and small firms, with 
high P/B ratios and scarce analyst coverage. The beta of Kumar’s high-risk portfolio 
is however only 1.09 (slightly above market average), indicating that the riskiest firms 
are more affected by firm specific rather than systematic risk. This shows that aside 
beta, also other risk characteristics of a stock should be examined carefully.  
Systematic risk stemming from the global stock markets affects to some extent most 
of the assets in the world, although for assets that are not constantly traded in 
exchanges the information of price fluctuations might be hard to obtain and slow to 
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react. Metrick & Yasuda (2012) report research evidence of private equity and venture 
capital funds having higher betas than the more liquid public markets.  
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3 VALUE & SIZE FACTORS  
3.1 Overview of risk factor research 
This chapter introduces academic research on founded stock market anomalies, 
specifically the value and size risk factors. In the chapter we discuss briefly theories 
why market anomalies exist, their relation to efficient market theorem, and more 
deeply focus on research covering the risk factors used in our study. Chapter 4 will 
combine research done from beta and the value and size factors to interlink previous 
chapters.  
Academic research has documented various factors that have historically provided 
excess stock returns versus the broader market such as the S&P 500. These factors are 
also called stock market anomalies, Smart Beta-factors, or risk factors. The name 
“Smart Beta” comes from the original CAPM proposition which states that a stocks 
beta should be a major determinant of its expected return; Smart Beta’s name implies 
that it is a more relevant way to explain excess returns. Investment strategies formed 
on these kinds of factors are based on academic research, which suggests that tilting 
the composition of portfolio to match better some known market anomaly will on 
average produce excess returns versus a market index-based portfolio. These strategies 
do not utilize active stock picking, but systematic screening techniques to accomplish 
a relatively low turnover portfolio with low costs and a theoretically sound basis. 
(Haugen & Baker 1996; Malkiel 2014)  
Among the most well documented of these anomalies are value and size factors. These 
factors have been documented to provide excess returns on various equity markets 
around the world. These factors seem to also be rather persistent, since their 
outperformance has been documented on nearly a century-long time-span. Despite 
this, even the most well documented factors seem to be also somewhat cyclical, 
meaning that on some time periods they might underperform the broader market. For 
example, after the financial crisis the value factor has underperformed against the 
market index. (Bauman, Conover & Miller 1998; Davis, Fama & French 2000; 
Schwert 2003; Asness et al. 2013; Malkiel 2014; Kawa 2017.)  
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Value factor refers to stocks that are trading on low price multiples. Value investors 
look at financial ratios and cash-flows to determine stocks that are “cheap” compared 
to their fundamentals and peers. Common ratios used in value investing are Price-to-
Earnings (P/E), Price-to-Book (P/B), Price-to-Sales (P/S), Dividend yield (DY) and 
various ratios based on a combination of Enterprise Value and different components 
from the income statement (EV/EBIT, EV/EBITDA, EV/S). (Fama & French 1998; 
Visscher & Filbeck 2003; Malkiel 2014; Bodie, Kane & Marcus 2014: 373.) 
For example Bauman, Conover & Miller (1998) use P/E, P/B, DY and price to cash 
flow (P/CF) to identify value stocks from other stocks.  
In our study, we use the price multiple approach to determine value factor proxies. 
This is important to notice, since there is a broad range of valuation techniques, which 
might yield differing results. Damodaran (2007) classifies the various valuation 
techniques into four general approaches: discounted cash flow valuation, liquidation 
and accounting valuation, relative valuation, and contingent claim valuation. Our price 
multiple usage falls under the relative valuation approach. P/E, P/B and DY ratios are 
used to compare the valuation characteristics of a stock relative to other stocks.  
Price multiples such as the ones used in our study are widely calculated and reported 
for listed companies. One reason for their popularity is their simple logic and easiness 
in estimation when compared to valuation models based on discounted cash flows or 
earnings. However, they do not give as comprehensive estimate of the valuation as 
more complex models. A value strategy based on screening and ranking potential 
stocks by price multiples is a variant of passive value investing strategy. (Lev & 
Sunder 1979; Kallunki et al. 2008: 154, 201-203.) 
In academic literature value stocks are usually identified by low price multiples (such 
as P/E and P/B ratios). Also dividend yield is used as a value proxy. The opposite of 
value stocks is in the literature often coined as growth stocks, describing stocks that 
possess high P/E and P/B with a low dividend yield. In practice, investors more often 
look at projected earnings and revenue growth rates when classifying growth stocks, 
since necessarily not all stocks trading at high price multiples or low dividend yield 
are growing businesses. The effect of value investing is theoretically suggested to 
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emerge from market ineffectiveness in pricing securities. This is especially caused by 
market overreaction to both positive and negative data and news considering specific 
companies. Negative financial news causes a downward overreaction in stock prices 
creating “value stocks” and vice versa positive financial news causes upside 
overreaction creating “growth stocks”. Theoretically the overperformance of value 
stocks then follows as the markets go through the process of mean reversal, i.e. 
readjusts the overreacted prices. (DeBondt & Thaler 1985; 1987; Visscher & Filbeck 
2003.) 
Another model proposed, which seems to explain the overperformance of value and 
underperformance of growth stocks is, that market participants extrapolate past 
performance into the future. This means that investors hold high expectations on stocks 
with a good recent performance and expect poorly performed companies to continue 
poor performance. When the growth stocks with high price multiples underperform 
their expectations, their stock prices regress towards the mean. Similarly, when the 
value stocks with low price multiples overperform their expectations, their prices 
increase towards the average multiples of the market. This theory is supported by a 
finding that growth stock underperformance is concentrated on earnings 
announcement dates, meaning that they categorically fail to meet high expectations. 
(Lakonishok, Schleifer & Vishny 1994; La Porta, Lakonishok, Schleifer & Vishny 
1997.) 
Furthermore, noise traders making erratic buy and sell decisions drive the overpriced 
stocks even higher and the underpriced stocks lower, providing mispricing 
opportunities to the market (Barber, Odean & Zhu 2006). Barber, Odean & Zhu (2009) 
also find that retail investors (who are more prone to noise trading than institutional 
investors) tend to concentrate both buying and selling activity to stocks which have 
experienced recently extreme gains or losses, providing more evidence that behavioral 
bias influenced noise trading is a driver of equity mispricing.  
In their influential study, Fama & French (1993) use P/B as a proxy of the value factor 
in their HML portfolio. Value factor is one of the main components of the Fama & 
French three factor model. In our study we use Price-to-Earnings, Price-to-Book, and 
Dividend Yield ratios as proxies for the value factor. Size factor refers to the historical 
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tendency of smaller company stocks to outperform larger company stocks in returns. 
Also, size factor is a main component of the Fama & French three factor model and 
the base of their SMB portfolio. Overall, Fama & French (1993; 1996) argue that value 
and size factors are proxies for higher risk, and thus provide on average higher returns 
over long time samples. Later on, Fama & French (2006a) report that P/B value effect 
diminishes substantially if profitability is not controlled for. This implies that more 
profitable firms deserve to be valued at higher P/B multiples. When profitability is 
controlled for, a strong P/B effect emerges in explaining returns.  
Fama & French (1998) report finding a strong value effect (as measured by P/B) in 12 
of the 13 major equity markets in the world between 1975 – 1995. They report global 
low P/B portfolios producing 7,68% higher yearly returns than global high P/B 
portfolios. They find significant value premiums also when the portfolios are sorted 
with P/E, DY or P/CF. Also, a size premium is found in international equities. In the 
same study Fama and French also investigate the stock markets of 16 emerging 
markets countries during years 1987 - 1995. These include data from nations rarely 
seen in equity research, such as Jordan, Venezuela and Zimbabwe. Value and size 
effects are discovered also in emerging markets, but Fama and French do not draw 
definitive conclusions on these findings because of weakly efficient market 
mechanisms, low number of stocks in sorted portfolios and short sample periods.  
The matter of why and how some of the known market anomalies exist is a subject of 
debate between different academics and market participants. The question is 
interesting because of its linkage to the existence of effective markets. Because the 
value and size anomalies are well documented to historically provide higher returns 
than the overall market, this can be viewed as a sign of market inefficiency, since if 
the markets are truly effective, these kinds of anomalies should be traded out of 
existence. This problem can also be viewed in another light by the traditional 
framework of extra risk amounting to extra returns. This view hypothesizes that 
smaller capitalization and lower price multiple valued stocks carry extra risk compared 
to the overall market. This would explain the existence of these market anomalies, 
since the return would be a compensation for a higher risk taken by the investors (Fama 
& French 1993; 1996; Campbell & Vuolteenaho 2004). Because of this theory, 
different factors that are used to build Smart Beta products are often referred to as risk 
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factors. The notion of differing risk factors leading to excess returns has led to 
mutually uncorrelated risk premiums being utilized to construct new types of 
diversified investment strategies (Bender, Briand, Nielsen & Stefek 2010). Bender et 
al. classify risk premium as the amount an asset is expected to gain for being exposed 
to a systematic risk.  
Malkiel (2014) advocates the proposition that excess returns earned by factor investing 
strategies are compensation for extra risk taken. He analyzes for example Invesco 
RAFI ETF (trading ticker PRF), which is a value strategy-oriented exchange traded 
fund. It had “beaten the index” during prior years and Malkiel wanted to isolate by 
which trades the abnormal returns were created. Malkiel finds that the ETF produced 
most of its excess returns during 2009 when 15% of the portfolio was invested in 
Citigroup and Bank of America stocks. The value strategy eventually worked well in 
this case, but at the time there was a realistic risk that the equity of these firms would 
have been entirely wiped out leading to a 100% loss on the two stocks (Malkiel 2014). 
Zhang (2005) also views value stocks to be exposed to larger risks than growth stocks 
because of more limited financial flexibility, and thus value premium is a rational 
reward for carrying risk.   
Lakonishok Shleifer & Vishny (1994) analyze the downside risk of value versus 
growth stocks and find that during the worst periods in the market value stocks decline 
less than growth stocks. Lakonishok et al. see this as evidence of value factor not 
adding extra risk, since value stocks seem to possess less downside risk than the overall 
market. If a stock would be riskier, it should be performing worse than the overall 
market in bad times.  
Although the value and size factors have been documented to provide excess returns 
in multiple countries and various time spans, even they are cyclical and might 
underperform on some time periods. Evidence of this can be found for example from 
Barbee, Mukherji & Raines (1996) who fail to find either P/B or market capitalization 
to having explanatory power on security returns between the years 1979 – 1991 on the 
U.S. market. They also suggest using Price-to-Sales ratio as a value proxy instead of 
the Fama & French-style BE/ME (P/B). Malkiel (2014) discusses effects of mean 
reversal on factor investing strategies and reports that periods of overperformance are 
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often followed by subsequent periods of underperformance. Malkiel (2014) also states 
that actual results of factor strategies often differ (underperform) versus simulated 
expected returns from strategy backtesting. Earlier on, Malkiel (2003) already 
hypothesized that the value anomaly might have been a phenomenon of the late 20th 
century, which would not hold permanently.  
Capaul, Rowley & Sharpe (1993) find value stocks outperforming the broader market 
in U.S., Japan, U.K., Switzerland, Germany and France during 1981 – 1992. The value 
effect however is captured in portfolios consisting of large amounts of securities, and 
the idiosyncratic risk among individual stocks is high. Thus, Capaul et al. propose that 
the best way of exploiting the value effect would be through an index fund which 
mechanically tracks low P/B stocks. The fund should also be internationally 
diversified, since the yearly value premiums across countries have little correlation 
with each other, leading to risk adjusted diversification benefits. It seems that Capaul 
et al. were early proponents of a “smart beta” product before they became mainstream. 
Capaul et al. also find that value stocks in their dataset tended to have lower betas than 
their growth counterparts, but often the results were not statistically significant, 
implying that the effect of value factors to beta is negligible.    
Freeman (1991) criticizes backtested investment strategies altogether, and recounts 
that even poorly constructed value and size strategies would have performed well 
during the 1980’s but implies that this does not mean that their good performance in 
the future would be evident. The increases in amounts of data and computing power 
have led to researchers being able to identify correlations which seem to predict stock 
returns or some other variable, even though their theoretical background might be thin. 
This might lead to finding correlations without causation; relationships between 
variables that seem to have predictive power within the dataset, but which are nonsense 
outside the dataset. Lo & MacKinley (1990) criticize tendency of some researchers 
and practitioners to overinvestigate and overfit data models to produce meaningless 
investment strategies. Freeman (1991) summarizes:  
“Given both intentional and unintentional biases in (investment) strategy development 
it is not unreasonable to assume that for every four completely informationless 
strategies tested over a year, one will appear statistically significant.”  
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The data snooping critique by Freeman (1991) is countered by Barber & Lyon (1997) 
who confirm the value anomaly results of Fama & French (1993; 1996) and 
Lakonishok et al. (1994) on a holdout sample not included in the previous researches. 
Barber & Lyon find the value and size factors to produce economically meaningful 
excess returns and dismiss the proposal that they would be a product of data mining. 
Further on, Davis, Fama & French (2000) show the value and size anomalies to exist 
on a long dataset from 1929 to 1997 in NYSE stocks. Value anomaly produces stronger 
excess returns than size, but both are statistically significant and economically 
meaningful. Bauman, Conover & Miller (1998) confirm that the value effect exists 
globally on a 21 country spanning dataset from 1986 to 1996.  
Cohen, Polk & Vuolteenaho (2003) show that value strategies are most profitable 
when the market is trading at low price multiples and when the value spread is high. 
They define value spread as “the difference between the book-to-market ratio of a 
typical value stock and a typical growth stock”. The research of Cohen, Polk & 
Vuolteenaho reinforces evidence of the cyclicality of investment strategies. 
Vuolteenaho (1999) also finds that the aggregate book-to-market ratio of the stock 
market is high (P/B low), when the risk premium of equities is high. Deriving from 
these studies implies that value strategies are most profitable when the entire market 
is perceived to be riskier than on average (e.g. political or macroeconomic risks).   
Petkova & Zhang (2005) investigate time varying market risk models. They find that 
value stock betas tend to covary with market risk premium while growth stock betas 
covary negatively with risk premium. This implies that value stocks’ systematic risk 
increases when uncertainty in the market increases and vice versa for growth stocks. 
Petkova & Zhang interpret from their results that time varying models help explaining 
value anomaly to some extent, but not entirely. Results of Petkova & Zhang are 
conflicting with the results of Lakonishok et al., who argue that value stocks do not 
expose to excess downside risk in down-markets.  
Liew & Vassalou (2000) researched the value and size factors relation with GDP 
growth in a set of industrialized countries. They find that strong value and size 
anomaly stock returns precede strong GDP growth by a year. Liew & Vassalou 
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interpret this as evidence that the anomalies might capture a business cycle risk factor 
not identified previously.  
Elton, Gruber, Brown & Goetzmann (2011: 413) list the various theories academics 
have proposed to explain the existence of market efficiency defying anomalies, such 
as value and size factors. They classify the theories into five categories:  
- The anomalies serve as a proxy for an omitted risk variable, i.e. 
they are risk factors.  
- The anomalies are not real, but instead a result of the research 
design and dataset, i.e. data mining. 
- CAPM contains misestimations, which systematically produce 
too low betas for small firm stocks. If betas would be estimated 
properly, betas would have a high explanatory power over 
returns. Note that this proposition applies only to size anomaly.  
- The anomalies remain because exploiting them would not 
produce excess returns after trading costs. Especially small cap 
stocks can be too illiquid to invest in for institutional investors 
controlling billions of euros.  
- Market inefficiency. Markets simply might be ineffective in 
pricing securities, even though plenty of research evidence is 
available on risk factors.  
Elton, Gruber, Brown & Goetzmann (2011: 450 – 452) also discuss behavioral 
reasons, such as disposition effect, overconfidence, prospect theory, and 
representativeness heuristic, which are examined in financial literature to affect 
security mispricing, thus creating market anomalies. For a comprehensive analysis of 
behavioral heuristics creating market irrationality, see Hirshleifer (2001).  
Since the discovery and widespread knowledge of value and size effects, there has 
been a surge in asset pricing literature trying to explain the reasons behind the 
anomalies with various statistical models. According to Lewellen, Nagel & Shanken 
(2010) The problem with a lot of these models is that they find a partly omitted variable 
in relation to P/B or size effect, which then produces a falsely high R-squared 
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(coefficient of determination) and seemingly explains the anomaly. Lewellen et al. 
suggest setting a higher standard to testing of asset pricing models to avoid statistical 
errors. This can be done by backtesting the models with a larger variety of differently 
constructed portfolios and datasets and exploring the theoretical background carefully 
to avoid spurious regressions.  
A possible example of spurious regressions and / or data mining can be seen for 
example in asset pricing literature trying to link corporate social responsibility (CSR) 
to financial performance. Different researchers have found either positive, negative, or 
neutral effects between CSR and financial performance. These kinds of conflicting and 
mixed results are due to econometrical failures and aggressive interpretation of results 
without considering possible problems in the research design. Generalizability of these 
results is obviously poor, when research results are as mixed as in this case. 
(McWilliams & Siegel 2000.)  
Even though many market anomalies are well documented academically, making a 
profit by trading on them seems to be challenging even for professional investors. 
Malkiel (2005) makes a comprehensive study of actively managed investment funds 
in U.S., Europe and emerging markets. He finds that for example in large cap U.S. 
equity funds, over any given time span (1, 2, 5, 10, or 20 years), the majority of actively 
managed funds (73% – 90%) lose to their benchmark index after adjusting for fund 
management fees. Malkiel states that even these statistics are biased in favor of 
actively managed funds by containing a large survivorship bias, since many of the 
worst performing funds have been terminated or merged into better performing funds 
to show a better track record. Malkiel also finds that individual fund performance has 
poor persistence, since on average funds which have the best performances over a 
period in Morningstar ratings tend to have poor performances over the next adjacent 
period. Malkiel’s results imply that many of the anomalies found by academic 
literature tend to be observable only in hindsight, and it is difficult to estimate how the 
markets function in the future by relying on data which is drawn from the past.  
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3.2 Regression model independent variables: Price-to-Book, Price-to-Earnings, 
Dividend Yield & Market Capitalization 
Here we go through a brief introduction of the independent variables used in our 
empirical analysis part.  
Price-to-Earnings ratio is a commonly used and reported value proxy, used both by 
practitioners and academics. It is a simplistic measure calculated by dividing the 
current stock price by the current earnings of the company. Alternatively, P/E can also 
be calculated by using forward estimate of earnings or trailing earnings as the divisor.  
 Basu (1977) documented the existence of P/E anomaly in NYSE stocks during the 
period 1956 – 1971. He constructed portfolios of low P/E stocks and rebalanced the 
portfolios annually. Low P/E stocks earned excess returns against the entire market on 
both absolute and risk-adjusted terms, even after taking into account transaction costs 
and taxation. Basu concludes that the market does not efficiently price in all the 
relevant information into stock prices, which allows value stocks to outperform.  
The largest single factor affecting P/E ratios is expectations about future revenue and 
profit growth. If the expectations of future profits are high, also the current P/E ratio 
should be high when compared to a firm with lower growth prospects. Riskiness of the 
firm should be reflected in P/E ratio, so that investors are willing to pay a higher price 
multiple for smaller risk and vice versa. When compared to P/B, P/E tends to be 
volatile because the divisor of the equation (earnings) can experience large annual 
changes. (Kallunki et al. 2008: 159.)  
Price-to-Book is the most common value factor proxy in academic research. P/B is 
calculated as the company’s market value divided by its book value of equity. The 
significance of P/B ratio in value factor research was cemented by the influential series 
of Fama & French studies in the 1990’s.  
Fama & French (1993; 1996) document that stocks which trade at a high BE/ME ratio 
provide excess returns versus the overall market on U.S. stock exchanges. The BE/ME 
ratio used by Fama & French is a reversed version of the P/B ratio used in our research. 
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The results of Fama & French are widely published, and they indicate that the value 
factor (low P/B) produces higher returns than predicted by the CAPM.  
Profitability of the business (ROE, ROA, etc.) has a large effect on the P/B ratio. 
Highly profitable businesses have high P/Bs and vice versa. If a company’s ROE is 
equal to its cost of equity, P/B ratio should be 1. Higher ROE produces P/B values 
above 1 and if ROE falls below the cost of equity, P/B should reflect this with values 
under 1. (Kallunki et al. 2008: 168-169.)  
Cakici, Tang & Yan (2016) find that value effect (as measured by P/B ratio) provided 
excess returns on emerging markets during 1990 – 2013. Low P/B portfolios 
performed well across the whole period and also during market turbulences, such as 
the 2008 financial crisis. The dataset consisted of 18 emerging markets countries as 
classified by MSCI and the only market where value effect did not appear was Brazil. 
Gaunt (2004) shows P/B effect on the Australian stock market. Gaunt also theorizes 
that low P/B stocks produce the best value effect when they are sorted also on ROA, 
so that stocks combining low P/B and high ROA are chosen. According to Gaunt this 
will reduce the risk of investing in low quality firms that might be selected through 
P/B screening.  
Morelli (2007) finds P/B value effect in the UK market. Kothari & Shanken (1997) 
find low P/B stocks to produce excess returns in the U.S. market 1926 – 1991. In the 
same study, Kothari & Shanken do not find dividend yield to be a factor influencing 
returns.  
Novy-Marx (2013) finds that screening stocks with firm profitability, as measured by 
gross profits divided by assets, provides similar excess returns as P/B value strategies, 
and utilizing simultaneously both low P/B and high profitability screening yields better 
results than using only P/B screening.  
Dividend yield (Dividend / Share price) is a commonly used metric to screen stocks in 
investment research. Dividends are an important component of many valuation 
models, such as the Dividend Discount Model.  
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Ang & Bekaert (2006) state that the “conventional wisdom” among investment 
literature tells that high dividend yields have a strong predictive power of high 
aggregate stock returns. Their research on U.S. and Western European data however 
disputes this belief and indicates that dividend yields have some predictive power on 
returns at short time horizons, but that this effect diminishes on longer time horizons.  
Visscher & Filbeck (2003) find mixed results on the effectiveness of high dividend 
yield strategies on Canadian data. Interesting to our research however is, that Visscher 
& Filbeck find that the high dividend yield strategy’s Sharpe and Treynor ratios 
outperform that of the market index. Since Treynor ratio is denominated by Beta, this 
finding suggests that on the Canadian market a high dividend yield correlates 
negatively with Beta.  
Hecht & Vuolteenaho (2005) find that dividend growth has a relatively strong 
explanatory power to cash flow growth, i.e. it is a cash flow growth proxy. Since 
corporate management generally is reluctant to cut dividends, a high dividend yield 
can be seen as management confidence to be able to generate at least similar cash flow 
also in the future. This suggests to our research that dividend yield should affect Beta 
decreasingly.  
The size factor is represented in our study simply by the market capitalization of the 
firms in our data set. Fama & French (1993; 1996) show that stocks with smaller 
market capitalizations provide higher returns versus stocks with higher market 
capitalizations. Possible explanations include that smaller companies have larger 
growth opportunities or that they carry higher risk, which in turn results into higher 
average returns. Banz (1981) had already earlier showed the overperformance of small 
versus large firm stocks in the U.S. market.  
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4 RELATIONSHIP OF BETA & RISK FACTORS 
This chapter focuses on academic research conducted on the relation of beta 
coefficients with value and size factors. We will utilize research directly linking the 
subjects and synthesize results and theoretical basis from other research. Foundation 
for the chapter is research discussed in chapters 2 and 3. Even though beta and the risk 
factors have both been researched extensively in academic literature on their own, they 
are mostly studied separately of each other’s.  
Both beta and the risk factors (value and size) have been researched thoroughly in 
academic literature. The most extensive research on beta has been conducted during 
the 1980’s and 1990’s, when the role of beta in financial literature seems to have been 
more important than today. Subsequently other measures, such as Value-at-Risk 
modeling have gained popularity as measures of portfolio’s riskiness, and academic 
research on betas seems to have been in decline, even though betas are still widely 
estimated and published by different investment research firms. For example, Google 
Scholar finds more academic papers with Beta-related searches for recent years than 
for the 1980’s or -90’s but the papers have much less citations and are usually 
published by researchers outside the United States, while the earlier decades’ beta 
research was widely U.S. driven.  
Value and size factors have been reported in academic literature already in the 1970’s 
and 1980’s, but they started to gain more attention after Fama & French (1993) 
published their three-factor model. Afterwards the practical implications of these risk 
factors have led to a widespread adoption of the research results into investment 
strategies and products.  
The original proposition of beta in the Capital Asset Pricing Model was that increased 
systematic risk would imply increasing average returns. However, this proposition has 
been denounced in academic literature (Fama & French 1992; 1996), which has on its 
part probably influenced to the declining interest in beta in academic literature. 
However, beta can still be used as a measure of systematic risk even though higher 
beta wouldn’t imply higher expected returns. CAPM itself and its empirical failure 
have also received a lot of criticism in academic literature (Fama & French 2004).  
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Beaver, Kettler & Scholes (1970) investigate the relationship of various accounting 
variables and beta on the U.S. market. They find that large firms (as measured by 
assets) have lower betas than small ones. This approach is a bit different than our 
market capitalization-oriented size factor, but it might implicate also that smaller 
market capitalization firms face higher systematic risk. Since companies with large 
assets often tend to operate on industries with relatively low margins and ROE’s, this 
result might also suggest that firms with low P/B ratios face lower systematic risk.  
Beaver et al. also find that high dividend payments (portion of earnings paid out in 
dividends) reduce the beta of a stock. This is hypothesized to happen because of two 
reasons; corporate management is usually extremely reluctant to cut dividends, 
meaning that dividends signal a confidence by the management to the future 
performance of the firm, and that investors might view dividends as less risky than 
capital gains, implying that high dividend stocks should face smaller beta.  
Beaver et al. make also several other interesting findings in their research about the 
relationship of beta and various accounting factors:  
- Growth is associated with higher beta 
- Leverage is associated with higher beta 
- Liquidity decreases beta (Current ratio)  
- Variability of earnings increases beta, strengthening the observation that 
cyclical firms and industries have higher betas. 
Gu & Kim (2002) investigate the beta determinants for U.S. listed restaurant 
companies. They include quick ratio, ROA, total assets, equity ratio, EBIT growth, 
asset turnover and dividend yield as independent variables to their regression analysis. 
The explanatory power of their model was however low (0,315) when compared to the 
excessive set of variables considered. They found statistically significant relationship 
in high asset turnover reducing beta and high quick ratio increasing beta. High asset 
turnover indicates efficient use of capital, but it is hard to theoretically justify why 
good liquidity (quick ratio) would increase systematic risk. Therefore, the results seem 
to at least partly be caused by randomness.  
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The determinants of beta can be analyzed on differing variables for different industries. 
Lee & Jang (2007) for example investigate the beta determinants for U.S. airline 
carriers. They find that systematic risk is decreased with high profitability, growth and 
flying safety, while it increases with leverage and firm size. The notion of firm size 
increasing beta is contrary to Beaver et al. (1970) and might be unique to the industry 
or a result of small sample size.  
Kim, Gu & Mattila (2002) investigate beta determinants for U.S. hotel REITs (Real 
Estate Investment Trust). They find that most of the volatility in hotel REIT stocks 
cannot be explained by systematic risk, meaning that the firm-specific risk accounts 
for most of the fluctuation. The systematic risk was correlated positively with leverage 
and growth. Similarly to Beaver et al. (1970), Kim et al. find larger firm size to reduce 
beta.  
The association of high beta to certain risk factors might also experience changes over 
time. For example, the Beaver et al. (1970) study reports smaller firms (as measured 
by assets) to have a higher beta, but during the fears of a U.S. - China trade war during 
Spring 2018, U.S. investors seemed to rotate from large cap into small cap stocks 
(Sindreu, 2018). This would not make sense if investors viewed this group of stocks 
to pose a higher systematic risk than that of the overall market. Therefore, it seems 
empirically that investors viewed small cap stocks to possess a smaller systematic risk 
in the particular situation faced by the markets, which was due to smaller international 
exposure.  
Amit & Livnat (1988) show that firms which have diversified their operations to 
multiple business sectors have on average lower betas, supporting the notion that 
different sectors have differing betas, and that diversification of business segments 
might reduce the systematic risk by decreasing cyclicality.  
Bowman & Bush (2006) investigate the usage of Comparative Company Analysis 
(CCA) to estimate Betas of non-listed companies in the U.S. market. They find that 
when firm size is controlled for, the CCA technique obtains reasonably accurate 
results. They also find that including dividend payout and operating leverage further 
increases the accuracy of their analysis. The research of Bowman & Bush implies to 
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our research, that the Size and Dividend Yield factors would be relevant in determining 
beta. The matter of possible omitted variable bias (OVB) which might be caused by 
leverage-factor is addressed later, in Chapter 5.  
Jegadeesh (1992) does not find proof that smaller companies would carry excess 
market risk. Thus, Jegadeesh does not see the size effect as a risk factor, but as a market 
anomaly caused by market ineffectiveness.  
Chatterjee & Lubatkin (1990) investigate the effect of corporate mergers and 
acquisitions on the systematic risk of the acquiring firms. They hypothesized that the 
more related the two combining businesses are, the more they would accomplish 
synergies and reduce beta. Chatterjee & Lubatkin however find that M&A in general 
tends to lower beta, not being dependent on the relatedness of the businesses. 
Regarding the theoretical base of our research, results from Chatterjee & Lubatkin 
imply that firm size correlates negatively with beta. 
Eun & Huang (2007) investigate return patterns and market rationality on Chinese 
stock market. They find that beta has no effect on returns while value factors (dividend 
yield and price-to-book) and size factor produce excess returns. The study’s results 
imply that beta is not related to value and size factors in the Chinese stock market.  
Lui, Markov & Tamayo (2007) study stock risk ratings from sell-side analysts. They 
find that a stocks beta increases when analysts adjust its rating to riskier. This implies 
that analyst ratings influence the perceived riskiness of stocks, and the market reacts 
more strongly to news on stocks with poor analyst ratings. Lui et al. also find that 
stocks which are rated riskier possess on average lower P/B ratios than rest of the 
market. The low P/B ratio in this case implies that the market is not confident in the 
future earnings prospects of these firms, which leads their stock prices to trade at low 
multiples compared to assets. In relation to our research, Lui et al. study’s results imply 
that high beta is associated with low P/B ratio.  
Rozeff (1982) finds in his research of U.S. stock market that firms paying high 
dividend payouts have significantly lower betas. Melicher (1974) studied U.S. electric 
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utility firms and found dividends having a negative correlation with beta and firm size 
having a positive correlation with beta.  
Heston, Rouwenhorst & Wessels (1999) investigate the effects of beta and size factor 
on stock returns in 12 European markets during 1978 – 1995. They find that beta is 
positively correlated with returns and size is negatively correlated with returns. 
However, when Heston, Rouwenhorst & Wessels investigate the relation of beta and 
size factor, they find that they are not related with each other, although both are 
producing return premiums.  
Ho, Strange & Piesse (2006) investigate risk premiums of beta, P/B and size factors in 
the Hong Kong stock market during 1980 – 1998. They find that over time higher beta 
stocks do not produce excess returns, but low P/B and low market capitalization stocks 
do. Ho et al. break up the dataset period into up and down markets. They find that high 
beta stocks overperform in up markets and underperform in down markets. Low P/B 
stocks overperform in up markets and perform similarly to the overall market in down 
markets, while low size stocks perform similarly to overall market in up markets and 
overperform in down markets. The results are inconclusive of any relation between 
beta and the risk factors.  
Harris & Marston (1994) investigate the determination of P/B ratios on base of betas 
and firm growth rate in U.S. stocks. They find that beta has a negative correlation with 
P/B, once growth is controlled for. If growth is not controlled, the results are 
insignificant. Harris & Marston hypothesize that markets price stocks facing high 
systematic risk with low price multiples, leading to the low P/B stocks having a high 
beta.  
Fama & French (2006b) investigate the validity of CAPM in U.S. and 14 foreign 
markets. According to CAPM, higher beta stocks should produce higher returns. Fama 
& French find that during 1926 – 1963 the value premium was explained in the U.S. 
by higher betas, but on the 1963 – 2004 period value stocks (measured by P/B) have 
lower betas than growth stocks. Fama and French find also that during 1926 – 2004 
small firms tend to have higher betas than large firms in the U.S. market.  
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5 DATA & METHODOLOGY 
This chapter introduces the research method of our regression analysis and the data 
used. We attempt to describe our research in such detail and transparency that the 
results can be replicated. In the chapter we explain reasons for the choice of datasets, 
investigated variables, and every econometric choice of method made in the analysis. 
We discuss possible problems and other issues regarding our data or the regression 
analysis, and how we have addressed them. We also discuss various aspects of the 
regression analysis technique and its compatibility with our data.   
The set of stocks used for the data of this study are the stocks of the Standard & Poor’s 
500 Index. The S&P 500 is a market capitalization weighted index which consists of 
the stocks of the largest 500 US companies which are publicly traded in NYSE or 
NASDAQ. S&P 500 is one of the most widely followed equity indexes in the world.  
The data collected for the variables covers the period of 25.5.2013 – 25.5.2018. The 
time period was chosen because we started our data analysis part on 26.5.2018 and 
wanted to use as recent data as possible. Including the start of the year 2018 to our 
analysis was also justified because of the increased volatility of the US stock market 
compared to earlier years, which in turn might have an effect on our Beta calculations. 
This would be valuable to the research since Beta is supposed to capture the systematic 
risk of a stock, which might not entirely be reflected during a long upside market, 
which the U.S. has experienced during recent years (Petkova & Zhang 2005). The 
length of the time period researched is 5 years because the standard method for 
calculating beta coefficients in academic literature is to calculate them from trailing 
60 months returns of the individual stocks and the market index.  
For the calculation of beta coefficients, we have collected monthly returns for the S&P 
500 index and the individual stock constituents of the index. In the regression model 
beta is the dependent variable and Price-to-Book, Price-to-Earnings and Dividend 
Yield ratios are used as independent variables for the value factor and market 
capitalization is used as the independent variable for the size factor. We have collected 
the 5-year monthly data also for each of the independent variables and calculated the 
arithmetic mean for them between 25.5.2013 – 25.5.2018. The reason we use the 5-
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year arithmetic mean rather than for example the closing value is because the betas 
have been calculated using the 60-month data, so this way the independent variables 
we use in the regression match the corresponding way of estimating the dependent 
variable. All data are collected from Thomson Reuters Datastream. Monthly returns 
are calculated from monthly stock and index prices on the 25th day of each month. The 
list of firms comprising the S&P 500 is received from the holdings list of State Street 
Global Advisors SPDR S&P 500 ETF Trust (ticker: SPY).  
We will make separate linear regression analyses for each of the independent variables 
to test their relationship with the equivalent betas. We make separate analyses for the 
variables because the theoretical background gives us reason to believe that the value 
proxies P/E, P/B and DY might encounter multicollinearity problems in the analysis 
which would negatively alter the reliability of our research’s results (Chen & Shimerda 
1981). Multicollinearity means that the independent variables are highly correlated 
with each other’s. This produces problems with estimating the standard errors and a 
combination of multicollinear independent variables might produce falsely low 
estimates of p-values indicating false statistical significance. The fact that we make 
separate regressions on each of the independent variables reduces the explanatory 
power of the regressions, but this is not a problem since we do not aim to produce a 
comprehensive model to fully estimate the beta determinants. Instead, our research 
aims to answer if and how loading investment products utilizing value and size factor 
anomalies affects the systematic risk of a portfolio. The investigation of three separate 
value proxies, P/E, P/B, and DY is useful because different market participants use 
different proxies for the same risk factor (Chen & Shimerda 1981).   
In the regression analysis part of the research, the dataset for the first set of regressions 
is the entire set of stocks. In the subsequent regressions the dataset is divided to 
separate industry classes. The dependent variable is always the beta coefficient. Each 
regression analysis has one independent variable, which is either P/E, P/B, DY, or Size 
(MV). The regressions are performed so, that for each industry sector and the entire 
dataset, there is a regression for each of the independent variables.  
The reason we use the variables we have chosen is because of simplicity, reliability, 
and availability of data. Size factor is simply represented by the market value of the 
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companies, since this is clearly the most relevant and used variable in academic 
research. Value factor is represented by three separate variables, P/B, P/E and DY, 
since all these variables are used in academic literature as proxies for the value effect. 
By investigating three different variables we can also examine if some of the variables 
are more or less related to beta. Value factor could possibly be represented more 
accurately by some other more sophisticated measures, but the theoretical background 
would become thinner and problems of data mining might emerge (Lo & MacKinley 
1990).  
As mentioned, size anomaly is represented in our study by the market value of the 
companies. It should be remembered however, that our dataset consists of S&P 500 
stocks which all have large market capitalizations. The 60-month average calculations 
used for the independent variables in the study’s regression model give the datasets 
stocks’ market capitalizations between a low of 3,2 billion USD and a high of 642 
billion USD with a mean of 38,3 billion USD and a median of 18,2 billion USD. 
Therefore, the dataset of our study does not include stocks that would be defined as 
Small Cap-stocks. However, the range of market capitalizations in the dataset is 
extremely large and therefore suitable for investigating the Size factor and its possible 
relationship with beta.  
We have chosen the S&P 500 index as the dataset for the study since the market for 
U.S. large capitalization stocks is arguably the most efficient equity market in the 
world, making the results of the study more replicable. Reinganum (1981) shows that 
stocks which trade with smaller volume will have a downward biased beta estimate 
because of nonsynchronous trading and large trading spreads. Cohen, Hawawini, 
Maier, Schwartz & Whitcomb (1983) argue that the ordinary least squares regression 
(OLS) used to calculate betas categorically underestimates them for small companies. 
This happens because small company stocks are less liquid and trade less frequently, 
leading them to easily experience large swings in value, caused even by a single large 
buy or sell order. Cohen et al. suggest that this asynchronous trading misleadingly 
makes the OLS beta regressions to appear as less correlated to the market, even though 
the actual systematic risk faced by these stocks should imply a much larger beta. These 
concerns should however be limited in our sample, since even the smallest market 
capitalization stocks of our dataset are large in capitalization and liquid in trading 
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activity. S&P 500 stocks are among the most liquid assets in the world combined with 
the lowest information asymmetry. If our research shows significant results, it is more 
likely that these results can then be replicated on other datasets, e.g. foreign stocks, or 
small cap stocks, than would be the other way around.  
In terms of gathering the data, replicability should not be an issue since the information 
needed to calculate betas and our factor ratios is widely available on different historical 
time frames and different asset classes. One possibility is however, that highly liquid 
S&P 500 stocks might possess different characteristics in their systematic risk and risk 
factor characteristics than for example emerging markets stocks, which would mean 
that even an identically replicated study would find differing results on differing data. 
Therefore, the question of sampling error does apply if the study’s results are being 
utilized on a different set of data. However, sampling error does not apply on the 
research’s results itself because it uses the entire applicable dataset (S&P 500). The 
generalizability of our research’s results would most likely apply to other equity 
classes which trade on highly liquid markets and are affected by a closely similar 
regulatory environment.  
Due to changes in the S&P 500 index composition during the research period, some 
of the companies which are currently included in the index have been added later than 
25.5.2013. This means that we were not able to calculate a beta coefficient for these 
stocks, since this would have required us to estimate their betas from shorter trading 
periods. This would have caused asymmetry to our data, so we decided to exclude 
these stocks from our data. The number of these stocks was 17. We also excluded three 
stocks because of lacking P/B data, one stock for lacking P/E data and one stock for 
lacking data of all the independent variables. Three stocks were also excluded for 
having a continuously negative P/B-ratio for the entire research period. For more 
information about how we deal with negative ratios in the regression analysis, see the 
next paragraph. The total number of stocks excluded from the regression analysis due 
to missing data is 25. The regression analysis part is performed with 475 stocks.  (See 
Appendix 2 for full list of excluded stocks.)  
The aspect of negative observations for independent variables and how to deal with 
them was a considerable issue for the research. P/E and P/B ratios are calculated by 
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dividing the stock price by earnings and book value of equity. If the earnings are 
negative for a period, P/E ratio will become a negative number and similarly if the 
book value of equity is negative the P/B ratio will be negative. Our research method 
involves calculating the arithmetic mean of 60-month observations for the independent 
variables. Negative observations will distort our data, since they will decrease the P/E 
and P/B ratios, even though their practical implication is exactly the opposite. The 
error might cause stocks with largely negative earnings and book value to appear as 
value stocks on the base of the biased ratios, while they are in fact right at the other 
end of the value – growth spectrum. The problem could be avoided by using opposite 
E/P and B/P (B/M) ratios. However, since P/E and P/B ratios are more widely used in 
practice outside academic literature, we decided to use these measures and control for 
the error within our study. Usage of P/E and P/B ratios makes the results more easily 
interpretable because of their widespread practical adoption. 
We control for this negative observation error by taking into account only the positive 
P/E and P/B observations when calculating the arithmetic means (averages). Then the 
average is calculated by dividing on the amount of used observations. The period 
25.5.2013 – 25.5.2018 contains 61 monthly observations for each stock’s each 
variable. Therefore, the standard procedure for calculating an individual stocks’ 60-
month P/E or P/B average is calculated by summing 61 positive value observations 
and dividing the sum by 61. If a stock has for example 11 negative observations for 
P/E or P/B, the average is calculated by adding the 50 positive observations and 
dividing the end result by 50.  
Our control model in calculating P/E and P/B averages is not perfect since it does not 
take the months with negative observations into account. However, by examining the 
data we find that the stocks with multiple negative observations mostly have extremely 
high P/E and P/B ratios for the positive observation periods. This means that the 
characteristics of these stocks are not changed significantly by our research method. 
The stocks which have some of their observations excluded will show on the growth 
end of the value – growth price multiple spectrum, even after the adjustments. Thus, 
the control measure does not produce material distortion to our variables for the 
regression analysis. (See Appendix 1 for full list of stocks and variables) 
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The regression analyses are performed on Microsoft Excel. Excel is not as powerful 
statistical software as for example SPSS, but it is suitable for our analysis. As described 
above, our study involves performing separate regression analyses with each of the 
independent variables, first for the entire population of stocks, and subsequently for 
stocks grouped by sector. The sectors are the following: information technology, 
financials, health care, consumer discretionary, consumer staples, industrials, energy, 
utilities, materials, and real estate. Sector classifications for the S&P 500 component 
firms are from the SPDR SPY – ETF. An additional sector in the S&P 500 is also the 
telecommunications sector, but since S&P 500 contains only 3 telecom stocks (AT&T, 
Verizon Communications, and CenturyLink) they are included in the regression set of 
the entire dataset, but we do not perform a separate regression set for telecom sector.  
S&P Dow Jones Indices and MSCI made an overhaul to the industry classifications in 
September 2018 (Randewich, 2018). In the changes, various companies previously 
classified in the Information Technology sector were moved to a renamed 
Communications sector (ex-Telecom sector). Our study utilizes the old sector 
classifications, used before the overhaul. This is simply because we downloaded our 
data from Thomson Reuters Datastream in May 2018, when the old classifications 
were in place.  
 The analyses covering the entire S&P 500 will show if beta is related to our 
independent variables across the U.S. large cap equity market. The separate sector 
analyses will control for industry effects by investigating if beta is related to the 
independent variables differently on stocks from differing sectors. The 
multicollinearity problem is controlled by separate regressions for the independent 
variables.   
One other statistical issue we must consider is that of Omitted Variable Bias (OVB). 
Since academic literature has occasionally found also other factors than value and size 
which affect beta, it is possible that if we find a relationship between the variables in 
our research, it might be caused by an omitted variable which is correlated with our 
independent variables.  
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Beaver et al. (1970) found effect on beta from the variables of growth, liquidity, 
leverage and cyclicality (See Chapter 4). They also found effect from asset size and 
dividend yield. The last two mentioned are captured in our research, while also 
cyclicality is to some extent controlled for by our division of the dataset to sectors. 
High growth firms have on average higher price multiples, which might imply that our 
value factor negatively captures the growth factor’s effect on beta. Liquidity and 
leverage remain factors which our study does not control for, so the possible OVB 
caused by these factors will stay as a matter to be addressed by future research.  
The effect of leverage increasing beta is also supported by researches by Hamada 
(1972), Amit & Livnat (1988) and Faff, Brooks & Kee (2002).  
In Chapter 2 we discussed criticism by Damodaran (1999) towards beta as a measure 
of systematic risk. The problems presented by Damodaran are however limited in our 
research. Damodaran criticizes the overdependence of smaller indexes (used in the 
beta regression) of a few large stocks. This effect is decreased by the usage of S&P 
500, where the price movement of a single stock does not produce large fluctuation. 
The effect of changing company fundamentals during the regression period is also 
captured in our study, since we use a 60-month average calculation for the independent 
variables considered. Damodaran’s criticism about large standard errors in beta 
estimates remains to be addressed.  
Damodaran (1999) also suggests controlling for leverage effect on systematic risk by 
using unlevered beta calculations. In our study, we use the traditional OLS regression 
beta. We do this because we want to examine the possible effects of value and size 
factors on systematic risk. Value and size factors do not consider leverage, which 
means that if leverage is an omitted variable, it should not be controlled for on the 
dependent variable either to produce an unbiased regression. If the independent 
variables have OVB from leverage effect it is not a problem to our research, but an 
issue which might be possibly useful to research in a separate study. The OLS 
regression beta is a standard measure reported in various investment purposes. When 
market participants screen for assets capturing value and size factors, we find it 
unlikely that they would simultaneously screen for unlevered beta estimates, which are 
hard to find. The practical usage of the standard beta and the fact that we do not control 
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for leverage effect on the independent variables, leaves the standard beta as the best 
systematic risk estimate to use in our regression.  
In previous chapters we have discussed potential problems associated with data 
mining. An excellent demonstration of the possibilities and dangers of data mining can 
be seen by Leinweber (2007) in his brilliantly titled article: “Stupid data miner tricks: 
overfitting the S&P 500”. We must be aware of the possibility to produce falsely 
statistically significant models also in our research. This means mapping our 
theoretical base carefully to investigate reasonable variables to begin with, and not 
interpreting our results in a too aggressive manner. We have selected our independent 
variables and dataset to be as widely used metrics as possible to increase the 
representativeness of our results.  
Below in Table 1 we can see descriptive statistics for the regression variables.  
Table 1: Descriptive statistics for the regression variables.  
  Beta PB PE DY MV 
Mean 0,99 8,63 59,20 1,86 38266 
Standard Error 0,02 2,30 13,10 0,06 2749 
Median 0,99 3,30 24,55 1,87 18197 
Mode    0,00  
Standard Deviation 0,42 50,23 285,48 1,34 59921 
Sample Variance 0,17 2522,87 81498,61 1,80 3590498573 
Kurtosis 2,59 418,22 239,11 0,19 30,08 
Skewness 0,64 19,91 14,82 0,44 4,57 
Range 3,48 1066,11 5087,33 7,99 638460 
Minimum 0,02 0,79 10,51 0,00 3176 
Maximum 3,50 1066,91 5097,84 7,99 641636 
Sum 470,82 4098,18 28117,63 882,79 18176480 
Count 475 475 475 475 475 
Skewness and kurtosis are extremely high for both P/B and P/E variables. This means 
that their distribution is far from the normal distribution (Skewness 0, Kurtosis 3). 
They both have an asymmetrically skewed distribution with a long right tail. Left tail 
is limited to the value of zero. The long right tail in P/B and P/E distributions is caused 
because of these ratios “exploding” if the ratio divisor (earnings or book value of 
equity) is extremely small.  
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From the descriptive statistics (Table 1) we can see that the maximum values for P/B 
and P/E are 1066,91 and 5087,33. By comparing these to the means and the medians 
(and by using common sense) we can easily see that these are huge outliers, which will 
probably have a distorting effect in the regression analysis.  
To mitigate outlier bias in our regression analysis part, we trim (truncate) the dataset 
by removing 1% of highest P/B and P/E stocks from the dataset. This means removing 
5 stocks with highest P/B and 5 stocks with highest P/E values. There is no overlap 
between these two sets of outliers. This reduces the number of observations for the 
whole dataset from 475 to 465. The trimmed outlier observations can be seen in tables 
2 and 3. 
Table 2: Stocks excluded from the dataset after trimming for 1% of highest P/B stocks.  
 
Table 3: Stocks excluded from the dataset after trimming for 1% of highest P/E stocks.  
 
We produce separate sets of regression analyses for the original and trimmed S&P 500 
datasets. For the industry sectors from where stocks are trimmed, we produce separate 
sets for non-trimmed and trimmed datasets. For example, for Health Care sector we 
first produce a regression set for the original sector components and then we produce 
another set after removing P/B outlier Nektar Therapeutics (P/B 103,01) and P/E 
outlier Incyte Corporation (P/E 706,77).  
Company Identifier Sector Beta P/B P/E DY MV
L Brands Inc. LB Consumer Discretionary 0,81 1066,91 19,13 3,21 18978
Boeing Company BA Industrials 1,27 144,07 21,56 2,60 108088
H&R Block Inc. HRB Consumer Discretionary 0,52 105,95 19,64 3,02 7147
Nektar Therapeutics NKTR Health Care 1,08 103,01 138,82 0,00 3176
United Parcel Service Inc. Class B UPS Industrials 0,92 88,77 33,67 2,87 72470
Company Identifier Sector Beta P/B P/E DY MV
S&P Global Inc. SPGI Financials 1,23 61,90 5097,84 1,35 28956
salesforce.com inc. CRM Information Technology 1,09 8,65 3275,78 0,00 49751
EOG Resources Inc. EOG Energy 1,44 3,35 940,39 0,67 50726
A. O. Smith Corporation AOS Industrials 1,44 4,51 794,12 1,11 5869
Incyte Corporation INCY Health Care 1,31 49,63 706,77 0,00 15571
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Table 4: Descriptive statistics for the regression variables after trimming 1% of highest P/B and P/E stocks. 
  Beta PB PE DY MV 
Mean 0,99 5,29 36,71 1,87 38313 
Standard Error 0,02 0,33 2,06 0,06 2800 
Median 0,98 3,22 24,34 1,87 18174 
Mode    0,00  
Standard Deviation 0,42 7,04 44,37 1,34 60375 
Sample Variance 0,18 49,58 1968,49 1,80 3645129318 
Kurtosis 2,60 23,33 41,17 0,22 29,78 
Skewness 0,66 4,38 5,52 0,44 4,56 
Range 3,48 60,50 455,22 7,99 637950 
Minimum 0,02 0,79 10,51 0,00 3686 
Maximum 3,50 61,29 465,72 7,99 641636 
Sum 459,71 2461,43 17069,91 867,96 17815746 
Count 465 465 465 465 465 
In Table 4 are presented the S&P 500 descriptive statistics after trimming P/B and P/E 
outliers. Skewness and kurtosis are significantly reduced for these variables, making 
their datasets more statistically robust. P/B and P/E means experience a major decrease 
after trimming, indicating that the trimmed outlier values had a high bias effect to the 
distributions.  
Beta, Dividend Yield and Market Value variables were already initially much less 
affected by outliers in their distributions, so they do not require trimming for the 
regression analyses.    
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6 RESEARCH HYPOTHESES   
This chapter introduces our research hypotheses based on previous academic literature.  
In our research we do not expect that the independent regression variables would 
nearly fully explain the determination of betas. As a reminder, this research is not 
supposed to produce a comprehensive framework for predicting betas using risk 
factors. What this research is about, is to investigate if and how beta fluctuates in 
respect to changes in the value and size factor variables. The purpose of this is to make 
empirical investigation on how an investment portfolio’s systematic risk is affected 
with changes in the portfolio’s utilization of value and size anomaly tilts.  
Our first 3 hypotheses are related to value factor proxies’ P/B, P/E, and DY. 
Hypothesis 1: Price-to-Book has a positive association with beta. 
Hypothesis 2: Price-to-Earnings has a positive association with beta. 
Hypothesis 3: Dividend Yield has a negative association with beta. 
A research article which has particularly influenced our hypotheses 1 to 3 is 
Lakonishok Shleifer & Vishny (1994), who find that in market downturns, value stocks 
experience less downside risk than growth stocks. Lakonishok et al. investigate the 
value anomaly overperformance through various differing proxies and their study 
includes all the value proxies used in our analysis.  
Rozeff (1982) finds in his research of U.S. stock market that firms paying high 
dividend payouts have significantly lower betas. Visscher & Filbeck (2003) find high 
dividend yield stocks in the Canadian market having superior Treynor ratios, even 
though their returns are similar to the overall market. This implies that dividend yield 
is negatively associated with beta in their dataset. Hecht & Vuolteenaho’s (2005) study 
also reinforces the theoretical background of dividend yield having a negative relation 
to systematic risk.  
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Relating to the size factor’s relation to systematic risk, Fama & French (2006b) find 
that during the 1926 – 2004 period small firm stocks tended to have higher betas than 
large firm stock in the U.S. market. This leads to our fourth hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 4: Market Value has a negative association with beta. 
Next, we will examine the results of our regression analyses. This is done in both S&P 
500 and individual sector levels.  
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7 RESULTS 
7.1 Regression results 
In this chapter we introduce and discuss the regression results of our study. This is the 
empirical analysis part of our research. As detailed in Chapter 5, we perform first a 
regression analysis set for the entire S&P 500 set with complete variable data (N=475). 
We perform a separate linear regression for each of the independent variables to avoid 
multicollinearity problems which might bias our results. After this we divide the 
dataset into sector subsets and perform the same process again for the subsets. We also 
produce separate regressions after trimming for P/B and P/E outliers. The process is 
discussed in detail in the Data & Methodology Chapter. The process produces 72 
separate regressions in total. For each of the regressions we report the regression 
coefficient, regression intercept, R-squared, and P-value.  
The regression coefficient tells how much a one unit change in the independent 
variable increases or decreases the value of the dependent variable. The regression 
equation is intercept +/- coefficient * variable value. For example, if a stocks beta 
intercept is 0,9, the stock has a P/E of 10 and the regression coefficient for P/E is 0,05, 
the stock’s estimated beta would be 0,9 + 0,05 * 10 = 1,4.  
R-squared is the coefficient of determination. It tells how much explanatory power the 
value of the independent variable has on the value of the dependent variable. Value of 
0 tells that the independent variable has no explanatory power at all, while a value of 
1 indicates that the dependent variable’s values are fully explained by the independent 
variable.  
P-value tells the statistical significance of the regression result. We use a statistical 
significance level of 95% which is widely utilized in academic research. This means 
that we report results statistically significant if their P-value is below 0,05.  
For the regression analyses, market capitalization values were calculated in billions of 
USD. In the Appendices 1 and 2 market values are shown in millions of USD. The 
conversion was made because the regression coefficients were extremely small with 
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millions of USD and often could not be shown with 4 decimal places. The conversion 
from millions to billions of USD is simply made by dividing the market values by a 
multiple of 1000. The conversion has no statistical impact on the regression results but 
makes them more easily interpretable.  
Introductory information for the industry sectors utilized in our sector classifications 
are from the MSCI Global Industry Classification Standards (MSCI Inc., 2018).  
Table 5: S&P 500 regression results, no trimming. N=475. 
Independent variable  Coefficient  Intercept R-squared P-value 
P/B   -0,0002 0,9930 0,0007 0,5752 
P/E   0,0001 0,9876 0,0017 0,3674 
DY   -0,0675 1,1167 0,0470 0,0001 
MV   0,0002 0,9834 0,0008 0,5263 
Table 6: S&P 500 regression results, P/B & P/E top 1% trimmed. N=465.  
Independent variable  Coefficient  Intercept R-squared P-value 
P/B   -0,0039 1,0090 0,0042 0,1637 
P/E   -0,0002 0,9944 0,0003 0,7205 
DY   -0,0658 1,1115 0,0443 0,0001 
MV   0,0002 0,9811 0,0008 0,5454 
In the table 5 regression results for the entire S&P 500 dataset (excluding Appendix 2 
stocks), we can see that the results for P/B, P/E and MV variables are not statistically 
significant. When we investigate the R-squared and P-values, we can conclude that for 
the U.S. large cap equity market, Price-to-Earnings ratio, Price-to-Book ratio and 
market capitalization seem to have practically zero predictive power on systematic 
risk.  
The regression result for dividend yield (DY) is statistically significant at both 95% 
and 99% significance levels (P-value = 0,0000018). This implies that S&P 500 stocks 
paying high dividend yields should ceteris paribus have lower systematic risk than 
their counterparts paying lower dividends. The regression result suggests that 4,7% of 
the systematic risk a stock is exposed to is determined by dividend yield. The 
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regression coefficient tells that in the dataset in general, every 1% increase in DY 
decreases beta by 0,0675.  
In table 6 we can see the P/B and P/E outlier trimmed S&P 500 dataset. Trimming of 
the outliers does highly affect the P/B and P/E P-values, but still neither of their effects 
are statistically significant. DY remains the only statistically significant beta predictor.   
Next, we will introduce and discuss the regression results for individual sectors. The 
sectors are here listed in alphabetic order. Full listing of stocks and variables can be 
seen in Appendix 1 if the reader wants to investigate for example sector compositions.  
For sectors where outliers have been trimmed there will be presented two tables, non-
trimmed and trimmed. For the rationale of trimming and overall regression 
methodology and statistical choices see Chapter 5.   
Table 7: Consumer discretionary. N=74.  
Independent variable  Coefficient  Intercept R-squared P-value 
P/B   -0,0003 1,0388 0,0107 0,3810 
P/E   0,0000 1,0332 0,0000 0,9855 
DY   -0,0170 1,0604 0,0050 0,5474 
MV   0,0005 1,0187 0,0046 0,5662 
 
Table 8: Consumer discretionary, trimmed. N=72.  
Independent variable  Coefficient  Intercept R Squared P-value 
P/B  -0,0014 1,0530 0,0015 0,7429 
P/E  0,0000 1,0448 0,0001 0,9261 
DY  -0,0084 1,0563 0,0012 0,7693 
MV   0,0004 1,0317 0,0030 0,6489 
Consumer discretionary sector consist of companies offering consumer goods in which 
demands are dependable on the state of economy. Consumer discretionary goods are 
non-essential to buy for consumers, but their demand increases when basic needs are 
first met. The consumer discretionary sector in S&P 500 consists from such varied 
firms as for example Amazon, Netflix, Ford, General Motors and McDonald’s.  
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In the consumer discretionary regression set we can see that none of the regression 
results are statistically significant, in fact they are far from the significance level 
altogether (P-values 0,38 – 0,98). From this we can conclude that it seems that our 
independent variables hold no power in explaining systematic risk in the consumer 
discretionary sector. One potential reason for the extremely low explanatory power 
between the variables might be the composition of the sector, since the firms 
comprising it have very different characteristics in common.  
Trimming for P/E and P/B outliers does not make any of the regressions statistically 
significant. On the contrary, the trimmed results show higher P-values than non-
trimmed, indicating that the few outliers had a biasing effect on the results. Overall it 
can be concluded that for the Consumer Discretionary sector our variables seem to be 
not related or extremely weakly related to beta.  
Table 9: Consumer staples. N=30.  
Independent variable  Coefficient  Intercept R-squared P-value 
P/B   -0,0015 0,6743 0,0084 0,6296 
P/E   -0,0076 0,8474 0,0330 0,3367 
DY   -0,0294 0,7228 0,0124 0,5578 
MV   0,0004 0,0570 0,0136 0,5387 
Consumer staples sector consists of firms which produce goods that have a relatively 
stable demand through economic cycles. Consumer staples products are essential to 
consumers regardless of their financial situation. Consumer staples sector contains for 
example Coca-Cola, Procter & Gamble, Altria and Walmart.  
As was the case with consumer discretionary, the regression results show also for the 
consumer staples sector that the regression variables have poor explanatory power and 
lack statistically significant P-values. Thus, it seems that in the sector the size and 
value factors are not correlated (or have at least extremely small correlation) with the 
systematic risk. Consumer Staples sector does not contain stocks which were trimmed 
in the outlier removal.  
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Table 10: Energy. N=30.  
Independent variable  Coefficient  Intercept R-squared P-value 
P/B   -0,0113 1,4448 0,0067 0,6661 
P/E   0,0000 1,4115 0,0001 0,9640 
DY   -0,0049 1,4199 0,0003 0,9310 
MV   -0,0008 1,4444 0,0139 0,5351 
Table 11: Energy, trimmed. N=29. 
Independent variable  Coefficient  Intercept R-squared P-value 
P/B  -0,0113 1,4438 0,0068 0,6713 
P/E  -0,0010 1,4528 0,0068 0,6695 
DY  -0,0045 1,4182 0,0002 0,9394 
MV   -0,0008 1,4433 0,0139 0,5421 
Energy sector comprises of companies in the oil, gas, and coal industries, and 
companies serving these industries. They include for example Exxon Mobil, Chevron, 
and Schlumberger.  
The regression set for Energy sector does not result in any statistically significant 
results. The high regression intercepts show that Energy sector as a whole is exposed 
to higher than average systematic risk, but the size and value factors are incapable in 
explaining systematic risk variation among the different stocks in the sector. Outlier 
trimming has a reducing effect on the P/E regression P-value, but it still remains far 
from statistical significance.  
Table 12: Financials. N=64.  
Independent variable  Coefficient  Intercept R-squared P-value 
P/B   -0,0018 1,1851 0,0022 0,7137 
P/E   0,0000 1,1777 0,0002 0,9140 
DY   -0,0535 1,2766 0,0157 0,3238 
MV   0,0009 1,1436 0,0180 0,2909 
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Table 13: Financials, trimmed. N=63.  
Independent variable  Coefficient  Intercept R-squared P-value 
P/B  -0,0061 1,1949 0,0098 0,4399 
P/E  -0,0017 1,2170 0,0107 0,4196 
DY  -0,0533 1,2758 0,0155 0,3314 
MV   0,0009 1,1426 0,0181 0,2930 
Financials sector comprises from banks, insurance companies, investment companies 
and asset managers. It contains such names as Berkshire Hathaway, Goldman Sachs, 
Bank of America, and Citigroup.  
The regression results for Financials sector do not show any statistically significant 
results. R-squared statistics are low and P-values high, implying that the size and value 
factors have poor prediction power in explaining systematic risk among financial 
stocks.  
Outlier trimming increases R-squared and decreases P-values for P/B and P/E 
regressions, meaning that the outlier removal makes the regressions a better fit, but 
they still are not statistically significant.  
Table 14: Health care. N=61.  
Independent variable  Coefficient  Intercept R-squared P-value 
P/B   0,0046 0,8119 0,0470 0,0932 
P/E   0,0009 0,8028 0,0689 0,0410 
DY   -0,0426 0,8867 0,0201 0,2756 
MV   0,0004 0,8300 0,0055 0,5699 
Table 15: Health care, trimmed. N=59. 
Independent variable  Coefficient  Intercept R-squared P-value 
P/B   0,0081 0,7901 0,0271 0,2127 
P/E   0,0025 0,7414 0,0522 0,0819 
DY   -0,0342 0,8687 0,0132 0,3858 
MV   0,0006 0,8107 0,0102 0,4455 
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The Health Care sector comprises of companies providing health care services, 
equipment, technology, and pharmaceuticals. Health Care sector contains for example 
Johnson & Johnson, Pfizer, Merck & Co, and CVS Health.  
The regression results for Health Care sector show that P/E has a 6,9% explanatory 
power on beta with a 95% significance level (P=0,0410). The P/E regression 
coefficient is 0,0009, meaning that P/E seems to have a small but positive correlation 
on systematic risk. P/B regression shows a P-value of 0,0932, while DY and MV 
regressions are far from statistical significance (P=0,2756, 0,5699).   
However, after trimming P/B and P/E outliers, the prior significance of the P/E 
regression is reduced to a P-value of 0,0819, meaning that the positive relation between 
P/E and beta is no longer statistically significant. The significance was boosted by 
outliers with high P/E and beta values. After trimming, it seems that our independent 
variables have only a weak correlation with systematic risk and no statistical 
significance.  
Table 16: Industrials. N=65. 
Independent variable  Coefficient  Intercept R-squared P-value 
P/B   -0,0006 1,1130 0,0014 0,7679 
P/E   0,0005 1,0905 0,0192 0,2707 
DY   -0,0548 1,2009 0,0217 0,2420 
MV   0,0000 1,1073 0,0000 0,9776 
Table 17: Industrials, trimmed. N=62. 
Independent variable  Coefficient  Intercept R-squared P-value 
P/B  -0,0310 1,2431 0,1077 0,0092 
P/E  0,0034 1,0173 0,0149 0,3440 
DY  -0,0525 1,1907 0,0193 0,2813 
MV   0,0001 1,1015 0,0000 0,9581 
Industrials sector comprises of manufacturing, machinery, infrastructure, aerospace 
and defense industries. For example, Boeing, General Electric, 3M, and Lockheed 
Martin are part of the Industrials sector.  
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None of the regressions for Industrials sector show statistical significance, implying 
that the size and value factors do not seem to be viable predictors of systematic risk in 
the sector.  
However, trimming for P/B and P/E outliers alters the regression results much more 
than for other sectors. P/B regression becomes statistically significant with a P-value 
of 0,0092. P/B has a negative relationship with Beta. The coefficient is rather small, -
0,0310, but it has a reasonably high R-squared of 0,1077.  
Table 18: Information technology. N=74.  
Independent variable  Coefficient  Intercept R-squared P-value 
P/B   0,0019 1,0675 0,0020 0,7271 
P/E   0,0000 1,0779 0,0004 0,8746 
DY   -0,0013 1,0809 0,0000 0,9604 
MV   0,0000 1,0798 0,0000 0,9724 
Table 19: Information technology, trimmed. N=73.  
Independent variable  Coefficient  Intercept R-squared P-value 
P/B  0,0019 1,0674 0,0020 0,7304 
P/E  0,0008 1,0461 0,0177 0,2986 
DY  -0,0012 1,0806 0,0000 0,9648 
MV   0,0000 1,0796 0,0000 0,9729 
Information technology sector comprises of firms producing IT services, software, 
hardware, semiconductors, and electronics. The sector experienced changes in the 
September 2018 overhaul of GICS standards by MSCI and some of its components 
were transferred to a newly formed Communications sector. Before the overhaul 
Information Technology sector was the largest S&P 500 sector by market 
capitalization. We have used the old MSCI classification in our study. The sector 
includes for example Apple, Microsoft, Facebook, Alphabet, Visa, and NVIDIA.  
The regression results for Information Technology sector show extremely small R-
squared values (0,0000 – 0,0020) and high P-values (0,7271 – 0,9724). We believe 
that with these results it is safe to say that in practice P/B, P/E, DY, and MV variables 
do not have any predictive power on systematic risk in the Information Technology 
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sector. Trimming outliers does not change the situation much since it does not make 
any of the regression results statistically significant.  
Table 20: Materials. N=23.  
Independent variable  Coefficient  Intercept R-squared P-value 
P/B   -0,0258 1,4176 0,0506 0,3022 
P/E   -0,0037 1,4160 0,0505 0,3027 
DY   0,2276 0,8435 0,1202 0,1051 
MV   0,0001 1,2793 0,0000 0,9924 
Materials sector consists of chemicals, gases, metals, paper, and mining companies. 
For example, Monsanto, Praxair, FMC and Albemarle are part of the Materials sector. 
Monsanto merged with Bayer AG after our dataset was collected.  
The regression coefficients for Materials sector seem counter-intuitive: P/E and P/B 
variables have a negative relation with systematic risk while DY has a positive relation. 
However, none of the Materials sector regressions are statistically significant.  
Table 21: Real Estate. N=33. 
Independent variable  Coefficient  Intercept R-squared P-value 
P/B   0,0003 0,6849 0,0000 0,9803 
P/E   -0,0011 0,7646 0,0324 0,3163 
DY   -0,0790 0,9457 0,0873 0,0951 
MV   -0,0041 0,7572 0,0183 0,4529 
The Real Estate sector consists of various kinds of REIT companies (Real Estate 
Investment Trust) and real estate development and services companies. Stocks 
included in the Real Estate sector are for example, American Tower Corporation, 
Simon Property Group, and Realty Income. 
None of the regression analyses for the sector show statistical significance, with P-
values between 0,0951 and 0,9803. DY seems to be the best predictor with its R-
squared of 0,0873 and 0,0951 P-value. We find it surprising that P/B has zero 
predictive power on the systematic risk (R-squared=0,9803, P-value=0,9803) in an 
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industry where the book value of equity is arguably more important than in many other 
industries.  
The results are in line with Kim, Gu & Mattila (2002) who investigated US Hotel 
REIT’s systematic risk determinants and tested dividend yield and market value but 
found no statistically significant relationship. Overall the Real Estate sector stocks 
have noticeably low betas as can be seen from the intercepts.   
Table 22: Utilities. N=28.  
Independent variable  Coefficient  Intercept R-squared P-value 
P/B   0,0287 0,2948 0,0028 0,7874 
P/E   0,0064 0,1713 0,4546 0,0001 
DY   -0,1195 0,7738 0,1300 0,0594 
MV   -0,0077 0,5079 0,1898 0,0205 
Utilities sector companies produce and distribute electricity, gas, and water. Utilities 
sector consists of for example Duke Energy, Edison International, and American 
Water Works. As can be seen from Table 22, the regression intercepts are extremely 
low for Utilities sector, implying that the sector as a whole is exposed to lower than 
average systematic risk.  
Regression analyses for P/E (P=0,0001) and MV (P=0,0205) are statistically 
significant. Also, R-squared values are rather high, with 0,4546 for P/E and 0,1898 for 
MV. The regression shows a positive relationship with P/E and systematic risk and a 
negative relation with MV. Also, DY regression appears to contain information with a 
R-squared value of 0,1300, but it slightly fails to be statistically significant with a P-
value of 0,0594.  
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7.2 Discussion 
We performed regression analysis sets to determine the relationship of systematic risk 
with size and value factors. We performed separate regressions to each of the variables, 
P/B, P/E, DY, and MV to avoid possible multicollinearity. Regressions were made for 
the entire S&P 500 and the different sectors composing it. P/B and P/E variables 
showed highly skewed distributions with large positive outliers. To avoid outlier bias, 
we trimmed 1% of the highest P/B and P/E observations from the S&P 500. These 
same stocks were eliminated also from the sector compositions where they belonged. 
We provided regression coefficients, regression intercepts, R-squared values, and P-
values for each of the regressions. For those datasets which were trimmed of outliers, 
we provide the statistics for both trimmed and non-trimmed datasets.  
The regressions made for the entire S&P 500 dataset indicate that dividend yield is 
negatively related to the systematic risk of stocks. The results are statistically 
significant in both, the trimmed and the non-trimmed regressions with 95% and 99% 
significance levels. The trimmed regression intercept shows that for a non-dividend 
paying company in the S&P 500, beta is on average 1,1115, and with every 1% 
increase in its dividend yield, beta decreases by 0,0658. Thus, for example a company 
paying a 3% dividend yield has on average a beta of 0,9141 and a company paying a 
6% dividend yield has on average a beta of 0,7167. R-squared indicates however, that 
dividend yield determines only 4,43% of the variation in beta, thus implying that the 
regression residuals are high, and there is a wide range of variation in the level of 
systematic risk even for a similar dividend yield paying companies. The results for the 
non-trimmed S&P 500 results are closely similar.  
Although the R-squared for the S&P 500 DY regression is relatively low, the 
regression coefficient is relatively high, as the effects on beta seen in the previous 
example with 3% and 6% yielding stocks are notable. This indicates that in addition 
to being statistically significant, the negative relation between dividend yield and 
systematic risk is also practically meaningful.  
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Price-to-Book, Price-to-Earnings, and Market Value regressions of the S&P 500 do 
not produce statistically significant results. Also, their R-squared values are extremely 
low. From this we can conclude that P/B, P/E and MV do not appear to have any 
notable relation with beta.  
The sector specific regression sets for Consumer Discretionary, Consumer Staples, 
Energy, Financials, Information Technology, Materials, and Real Estate sectors did 
not produce statistically significant results. Thus, it seems that size and value factors 
are not related to the systematic risk variation between intra-industry firms in these 
sectors.  
The regression set for Health Care sector initially showed a statistically significant 
positive relation between Price-to-Earnings variable and systematic risk with a 95% 
significance level. However, after trimming for outliers, the regression lost its 
statistical significance, implying that the strong relation was highly affected by the 
removed outliers.  
The non-trimmed regression set for Industrials sector does not show any statistically 
significant results, but after trimming for outliers, Price-to-Book regression produces 
a statistically significant relation with 95% and 99% significance levels. Opposite to 
our hypotheses, P/B has a negative relation with beta in the regression. This means in 
practice that in the Industrials sector, companies with higher than average P/B ratios 
were exposed to lower than average systematic risk during our research period.  
Utilities sector’s regression set produces two statistically significant results; Price-to-
Earnings is positively related to systematic risk and Market Value is negatively related 
to systematic risk. P/E regression is statistically significant at the 99% level and shows 
a high R-squared of 0,4546, implying that 45% of the beta variation in the Utilities 
sector is determined by the level of a company’s P/E ratio. The MV regression is 
statistically significant at the 95% level and its R-squared indicates that 19% of the 
beta variation in the sector is explained by the market capitalization of a firm.  
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Overall, 6 out of a total of 72 regressions conducted in our empirical analysis resulted 
in statistically significant outcomes. We view this result as evidence that the value and 
size factors do not seem to be correlated with systematic risk at a large scale.  
Perhaps the most meaningful result of our study is the negative relation of dividend 
yield with beta in the whole sample regression sets. This result indicates that on 
average, the higher dividend yield a stock is paying, the lower its beta is. The effect of 
dividend yield decreasing systematic risk is significant both statistically and 
practically, since the regression coefficient is quite large.  
An interesting observation is, that even though the DY regression was statistically 
significant for the entire S&P 500 dataset, none of the sector specific DY regressions 
were statistically significant. This implies that dividend yield has explanatory power 
on systematic risk across the S&P 500, but not so much between different stocks of a 
given industry. This might indicate that the effect is explained by different sectors 
having on average differing betas and dividend yields, so that low beta sectors have on 
average high dividend yields, and high beta sectors have on average low dividend 
yields. This would explain the mixed results between our entire dataset regressions 
and sector specific regression sets.  
A possible reason for the statistically significant positive P/E regression in Utilities 
sector might be that because of the defensiveness and stableness of the sector, there 
are less other beta determinants (e.g. growth) than on other sectors, which leads to 
price multiples having a larger effect on the level of systematic risk.  
The statistically significant negative MV regression in Utilities sector, and negative 
P/B regression in Industrials sector might be caused by some actual determinants, or 
they can equally well be results of randomness. A significant relation between beta 
and market value was not observed in any other regression set than the Utilities sector, 
and similarly P/B regression were not statistically significant in any other sector than 
the industrials. Of course, also the P/E regression result for Utilities sector could be 
caused by randomness, but for this regression there exists better theoretical 
background to possibly explain the result. 
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Overall, most of our regressions lack statistical significance, implying that in general 
the value and size factors do not appear to be strongly related to systematic risk. 
However, if value factor is proxied by dividend yield, it has a decreasing effect on 
systematic risk, although this effect seems to be also related to sector differences. Thus, 
we conclude that our results indicate that value and size factors do not seem to be 
correlated with systematic risk, except if dividend yield is used as a value factor metric, 
in which case it has a systematic risk decreasing effect.  
Our research hypotheses 1, 2, and 4 relating to P/B, P/E, and MV associations with 
beta are inconclusive. Overall, our empirical analysis does not show statistically or 
practically significant results that would either confirm nor reject these hypotheses. 
Hypothesis 3 is confirmed by our empirical analysis. Across the S&P 500 dividend 
yield does indeed have a negative association with systematic risk. This effect seems 
to be related to sector differences, and the effect does not show on sector level 
regressions.  
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8 SUMMARY & CONCLUSIONS  
The purpose of our research was to investigate whether loading an investment portfolio 
with securities utilizing value and size factors would influence the level of the 
portfolio’s systematic risk. This was conducted by testing if beta is related to value 
factor proxies Price-to-Book ratio (P/B), Price-to-Earnings ratio (P/E), and Dividend 
Yield (DY) or the size factor as represented by company’s stock market capitalization 
(MV) in the S&P 500 stock market index. The question is relevant since risk factor-
based investment strategies have gained widespread attention during recent years.  
The empirical analysis was done by linear regression analysis, where beta is the 
dependent variable and the different value and size factor proxies are independent 
variables. The independent variables were tested on separate regressions to avoid 
multicollinearity.  
Regressions were made for the entire S&P 500 dataset, and separately to each 
individual sector as classified by MSCI GICS standards pre-September 2018 changes. 
Telecom sector was excluded because of low number of observations. Individual 
stocks with missing variables were removed. P/B and P/E variables had large outliers, 
which were trimmed. Both trimmed and non-trimmed regression results were shown. 
For further detail of research methodology and process, see Chapter 5.  
Across the S&P 500 dataset, Price-to-Book, Price-to-Earnings, and Market Value 
variables did not produce statistically or practically significant regression results. The 
regression result for dividend yield is statistically significant at 99% significance level 
(P-value = 0,0000018). This implies that S&P 500 stocks paying high dividend yields 
are on average exposed to lower systematic risk than their counterparts paying lower 
dividends yields. The trimmed regression intercept shows that for a non-dividend 
paying company in the S&P 500, beta is on average 1,1115, and with every 1% 
increase in its dividend yield, beta decreases by 0,0658. Thus, for example a company 
paying a 3% dividend yield has on average a beta of 0,9141 and a company paying a 
6% dividend yield has on average a beta of 0,7167. R-squared indicates however, that 
dividend yield determines only 4,43% of the variation in beta, thus implying that the 
regression residuals are high, and there is a wide range of variation in the level of 
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systematic risk even for similar dividend yield paying companies. The results for the 
non-trimmed S&P 500 regressions are closely similar. The large regression coefficient 
in the S&P 500 dividend yield regression shows that the effect of dividend yield 
decreasing beta is in addition to statistical significance also practically significant.  
The negative association of dividend yield with beta did not appear statistically 
significant in sector specific regressions. This seems to implicate that the effect might 
be caused by sector differences. Dividend yield has explanatory power on systematic 
risk across the S&P 500, but not so much between different stocks of a given industry. 
This might indicate that the effect is explained by different sectors having on average 
differing betas and dividend yields, so that low beta sectors have on average high 
dividend yields, and high beta sectors have on average low dividend yields. This would 
explain the mixed results between our entire dataset regressions and sector specific 
regression sets. In practice this means that high-dividend yield stocks often operate in 
defensive sectors of the economy.  
We also found individual statistically significant relationships between value factor 
and size factor proxies in the sector specific regressions, but their results were mixed 
and overall only 6 of our entire set of 72 regressions returned statistically significant 
results. Because of the mixed and statistically weak results in sector specific 
regressions, we conclude that the aforementioned negative association between 
dividend yield and systematic risk across S&P 500 is the only practically significant 
and reliable finding in our research.  
We refrain from making further conclusions from the sector specific regressions, since 
no clear trends were spotted between the variables. Trying to explain the mixed and 
contradictory sector specific regressions might be a too aggressive way of interpreting 
the results. Because of the lack of any clear trends, the few statistically significant 
sector specific results might just as well be caused by spurious regressions.  
The finding of dividend yield having a negative association to beta supports prior 
research evidence by Rozeff (1982), Lakonishok Shleifer & Vishny (1994), Visscher 
& Filbeck (2003), and Hecht & Vuolteenaho (2005). However, contrary to Lakonishok 
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et al. (1994) study, which found all the value factor proxies (P/B, P/E, and DY) to be 
risk reducing, our study found this effect only from the dividend yield.  
Fama & French (1993; 1996) and Malkiel (2014) argue that the historical excess 
returns of factor-based investment strategies are explained by these strategies carrying 
a higher risk versus the overall market. Our study’s findings do not support this view. 
We did not find value or size factor proxies to be systematic risk increasing variables. 
Dividend yield oppositely had a systematic risk decreasing effect.  
The results of our research can be summarized in that value factor proxies P/B ratio 
and P/E ratio, and size factor as represented by market capitalization do not overall 
have statistically or practically significant relation to the level of systematic risk, 
neither across the entire S&P 500 or within separate sectors. Value factor proxy 
dividend yield has a negative relation with systematic risk across S&P 500 stocks, 
which is significant both statistically and practically. However, this effect is not found 
within separate sector analyses, indicating that the effect across S&P 500 is explained 
by different sectors having on average differing betas and dividend yields, so that low 
beta sectors have on average high dividend yields, and high beta sectors have on 
average low dividend yields. 
As the goal of our study was to answer to the question if loading an investment 
portfolio with securities utilizing value and size factor anomalies would have an effect 
on the level of the portfolio’s systematic risk, our answer based on our regression 
analyses is that the factors do not seem to be related to the level of systematic risk. 
Price-to-Book, Price-to-Earnings, and market capitalization variables were not shown 
to either increase nor decrease systematic risk. If value factor is represented by 
dividend yield, it has a systematic risk decreasing effect, but not between stocks of a 
mutual industry sector.  
The results of our study are relevant to investors considering factor investing 
strategies. Our research’s results show that factor investment strategies utilizing value 
and size anomalies in the U.S. large capitalization equity market are not exposed to 
higher systematic risk than the overall market. Further research would be useful to 
conduct on the equity markets of various other countries. Systematic risk association 
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studies could also be made for other factors used in the construction of Smart Beta 
products. Econometric limitations of our research and how they are addressed are 
discussed extensively in Chapter 5.  
The results of this study support the usage of factor investment strategies as a part of 
an investment portfolio. The results should be viewed in light of the vast academic 
literature showing overperforming long-term average returns by value and size factor 
strategies. A major criticism of factor strategies is that the factors serve as proxies for 
additional risk. Considering our results, value and size factor-based investment 
strategies do not expose a portfolio to heightened systematic risk.   
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APPENDICES 
Appendix 1. S&P 500 full variables dataset.  
S&P 500 stocks used for the regression analyses. Sources: Stock listing for S&P 500 from SPY ETF holdings 
list 24.5.2018, regression variables data from Thomson Reuters Datastream 25.5.2018. N = 475. Dividend 
yield in percentages, market value in millions of USD.  
Company Identifier Sector Beta P/B P/E DY MV 
Apple Inc. AAPL Information Technology 1,09 5,00 14,69 1,92 641636,09 
Microsoft Corporation MSFT Information Technology 1,00 5,72 24,69 2,58 436897,46 
Amazon.com Inc. AMZN Consumer Discretionary 1,25 17,07 465,72 0,00 310360,75 
Facebook Inc. Class A FB Information Technology 1,37 5,98 163,63 0,00 238668,62 
JPMorgan Chase & Co. JPM Financials 1,31 1,15 12,50 2,58 259177,25 
Berkshire Hathaway Inc. Class B BRK.B Financials 0,81 1,39 18,54 0,00 178307,22 
Exxon Mobil Corporation XOM Energy 1,11 2,09 20,89 3,34 368247,10 
Alphabet Inc. Class A GOOGL Information Technology 0,89 3,91 35,67 0,00 235175,15 
Johnson & Johnson JNJ Health Care 0,85 4,47 20,43 2,77 302359,90 
Bank of America Corp BAC Financials 1,57 0,83 21,24 1,14 194995,42 
Intel Corporation INTC Information Technology 1,05 2,52 14,92 3,06 160447,69 
Chevron Corporation CVX Energy 1,42 1,39 28,52 3,92 209433,98 
Wells Fargo & Company WFC Financials 1,28 1,52 13,02 2,81 262408,93 
Visa Inc. Class A V Information Technology 1,12 6,48 35,97 0,72 144960,36 
UnitedHealth Group Incorporated UNH Health Care 0,74 3,22 19,32 1,55 126952,43 
Home Depot Inc. HD Consumer Discretionary 1,01 50,36 23,02 2,11 153627,16 
Pfizer Inc. PFE Health Care 0,78 2,95 30,95 3,55 201878,21 
Cisco Systems Inc. CSCO Information Technology 1,21 2,36 16,06 3,20 147578,71 
AT&T Inc. T 
Telecommunication 
Services 0,41 1,85 20,52 5,26 208883,27 
Verizon Communications Inc. VZ 
Telecommunication 
Services 0,48 9,12 25,72 4,57 191623,13 
Boeing Company BA Industrials 1,27 144,07 21,56 2,60 108088,32 
Procter & Gamble Company PG Consumer Staples 0,66 3,73 22,24 3,18 220475,81 
Citigroup Inc. C Financials 1,57 0,79 13,95 0,68 158852,60 
Mastercard Incorporated Class A MA Information Technology 1,06 18,63 30,30 0,65 109526,31 
AbbVie Inc. ABBV Health Care 0,83 28,53 24,92 3,48 103415,39 
Coca-Cola Company KO Consumer Staples 0,65 7,90 27,41 3,15 183733,30 
Merck & Co. Inc. MRK Health Care 0,64 3,82 31,25 3,22 160072,89 
Walt Disney Company DIS Consumer Discretionary 1,25 3,50 20,06 1,30 156489,36 
Netflix Inc. NFLX Consumer Discretionary 1,11 17,98 246,68 0,00 48277,54 
NVIDIA Corporation NVDA Information Technology 1,27 6,43 32,48 1,25 41154,81 
Comcast Corporation Class A CMCSA Consumer Discretionary 1,20 2,70 18,96 1,72 139321,77 
PepsiCo Inc. PEP Consumer Staples 0,68 11,22 23,35 2,83 145010,32 
Oracle Corporation ORCL Information Technology 1,10 3,49 18,20 1,44 176088,94 
McDonald's Corporation MCD Consumer Discretionary 0,75 9,05 21,75 3,07 105255,02 
General Electric Company GE Industrials 1,10 2,68 32,78 3,31 246294,45 
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International Business Machines 
Corporation IBM Information Technology 0,99 10,00 12,67 3,15 162053,96 
Adobe Systems Incorporated ADBE Information Technology 0,93 6,58 81,38 0,00 50598,36 
Walmart Inc. WMT Consumer Staples 0,64 3,00 16,96 2,62 239729,12 
Amgen Inc. AMGN Health Care 1,12 4,23 18,39 2,31 111712,77 
3M Company MMM Industrials 1,12 8,50 21,69 2,46 103367,20 
Medtronic plc MDT Health Care 0,74 2,24 26,71 2,02 92902,00 
Union Pacific Corporation UNP Industrials 1,17 3,84 19,07 2,16 85583,10 
Honeywell International Inc. HON Industrials 0,96 4,72 20,44 2,05 85194,68 
Texas Instruments Incorporated TXN Information Technology 1,38 6,17 22,74 2,61 64621,59 
Abbott Laboratories ABT Health Care 1,28 2,89 33,60 2,13 70396,25 
Altria Group Inc MO Consumer Staples 0,57 19,24 18,01 4,19 107715,27 
Booking Holdings Inc. BKNG Consumer Discretionary 1,06 7,32 30,96 0,00 69761,53 
Broadcom Inc. AVGO Information Technology 0,77 4,81 51,35 1,70 50803,25 
Schlumberger NV SLB Energy 1,31 2,84 61,45 2,32 108010,26 
Accenture Plc Class A ACN Information Technology 0,77 9,46 20,34 2,09 66445,98 
United Technologies Corporation UTX Industrials 1,31 3,17 16,06 2,32 95217,83 
Caterpillar Inc. CAT Industrials 1,37 3,90 53,99 3,13 58795,61 
NIKE Inc. Class B NKE Consumer Discretionary 0,98 7,06 26,67 1,20 69018,05 
Gilead Sciences Inc. GILD Health Care 1,13 6,91 16,54 1,45 119587,12 
salesforce.com inc. CRM Information Technology 1,09 8,65 3275,78 0,00 49750,71 
QUALCOMM Incorporated QCOM Information Technology 1,03 2,95 18,86 3,13 100398,09 
Costco Wholesale Corporation COST Consumer Staples 0,87 5,75 28,16 1,11 64655,93 
Thermo Fisher Scientific Inc. TMO Health Care 1,01 2,55 30,65 0,45 55922,10 
Bristol-Myers Squibb Company BMY Health Care 0,89 6,82 39,77 2,63 95845,81 
Goldman Sachs Group Inc. GS Financials 1,32 1,08 12,31 1,34 80418,82 
Starbucks Corporation SBUX Consumer Discretionary 0,75 13,29 461,82 1,43 73644,42 
Lockheed Martin Corporation LMT Industrials 0,60 23,70 18,33 3,02 66914,44 
ConocoPhillips COP Energy 1,76 1,75 12,14 3,47 70427,02 
Lowe's Companies Inc. LOW Consumer Discretionary 1,13 8,38 24,00 1,68 62477,50 
Eli Lilly and Company LLY Health Care 0,37 5,82 29,59 2,89 80073,07 
U.S. Bancorp USB Financials 1,08 1,90 14,40 2,32 78381,73 
United Parcel Service Inc. Class B UPS Industrials 0,92 88,77 33,67 2,87 72470,48 
NextEra Energy Inc. NEE Utilities 0,17 2,24 19,38 2,92 52184,04 
Morgan Stanley MS Financials 1,58 1,02 17,65 1,65 69678,24 
American Express Company AXP Financials 1,09 3,87 15,50 1,47 78594,53 
Time Warner Inc. TWX Consumer Discretionary 0,81 2,48 17,40 1,80 65942,80 
Micron Technology Inc. MU Information Technology 1,16 1,98 14,85 0,00 28112,02 
PNC Financial Services Group Inc. PNC Financials 0,98 1,19 13,55 2,19 50356,93 
Charles Schwab Corporation SCHW Financials 1,46 3,41 30,83 0,85 43880,02 
EOG Resources Inc. EOG Energy 1,44 3,35 940,39 0,67 50726,47 
BlackRock Inc. BLK Financials 1,69 2,03 18,97 2,44 59949,58 
CVS Health Corporation CVS Health Care 0,96 2,40 19,56 1,87 91445,75 
Occidental Petroleum 
Corporation OXY Energy 1,01 2,27 71,20 3,86 60602,89 
Danaher Corporation DHR Health Care 0,94 2,35 22,29 0,54 58242,37 
Raytheon Company RTN Industrials 0,56 3,78 18,36 2,26 38287,94 
FedEx Corporation FDX Industrials 1,44 3,05 26,39 0,67 47623,61 
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Chubb Limited CB Financials 0,94 1,25 13,64 2,26 47804,80 
Biogen Inc. BIIB Health Care 1,51 6,16 25,30 0,00 67537,15 
Celgene Corporation CELG Health Care 1,30 12,58 45,21 0,00 81171,41 
Becton Dickinson and Company BDX Health Care 0,79 4,00 39,50 1,69 33440,68 
American Tower Corporation AMT Real Estate 0,67 9,02 58,73 1,79 43800,14 
Mondelez International Inc. Class 
A MDLZ Consumer Staples 0,88 2,29 25,89 1,72 63591,38 
Anthem Inc. ANTM Health Care 0,81 1,54 15,43 1,64 38470,92 
Automatic Data Processing Inc. ADP Information Technology 1,09 8,97 27,72 2,34 41778,82 
Bank of New York Mellon 
Corporation BK Financials 1,37 1,22 16,78 1,77 45170,85 
General Dynamics Corporation GD Industrials 0,87 4,01 18,41 2,00 46735,40 
Northrop Grumman Corporation NOC Industrials 0,70 5,40 17,71 1,83 35867,64 
Aetna Inc. AET Health Care 0,37 2,50 20,12 1,09 38666,38 
CSX Corporation CSX Industrials 1,56 2,72 18,77 2,09 34314,53 
Stryker Corporation SYK Health Care 0,64 4,33 35,77 1,39 40354,99 
TJX Companies Inc TJX Consumer Discretionary 0,43 9,97 21,13 1,30 46023,50 
Monsanto Company MON Materials 0,99 7,70 25,48 1,84 51889,32 
Colgate-Palmolive Company CL Consumer Staples 0,82 41,10 30,85 2,23 61089,57 
CME Group Inc. Class A CME Financials 0,43 1,61 27,55 2,23 34256,10 
Walgreens Boots Alliance Inc WBA Consumer Staples 1,01 2,87 24,09 1,95 76745,25 
Activision Blizzard Inc. ATVI Information Technology 1,08 3,10 30,09 0,79 27244,58 
Valero Energy Corporation VLO Energy 0,96 1,38 11,06 3,05 29641,02 
Applied Materials Inc. AMAT Information Technology 1,29 3,79 24,05 1,73 31825,40 
Duke Energy Corporation DUK Utilities 0,23 1,31 22,59 4,32 53643,14 
Intuitive Surgical Inc. ISRG Health Care 0,45 5,54 38,10 0,00 24721,30 
S&P Global Inc. SPGI Financials 1,23 61,90 5097,84 1,35 28956,27 
Deere & Company DE Industrials 0,99 3,90 15,07 2,45 33320,03 
Allergan plc AGN Health Care 0,60 1,57 55,10 0,45 72139,63 
Charter Communications Inc. 
Class A CHTR Consumer Discretionary 0,84 43,37 48,55 0,00 42945,77 
Phillips 66 PSX Energy 1,04 1,85 15,21 2,72 43402,79 
MetLife Inc. MET Financials 1,32 1,08 41,72 2,92 54830,40 
Simon Property Group Inc. SPG Real Estate 0,64 12,44 35,31 3,42 54934,40 
General Motors Company GM Consumer Discretionary 1,71 1,37 13,19 3,57 52889,26 
American International Group Inc. AIG Financials 1,10 0,85 172,15 1,53 67582,15 
Intuit Inc. INTU Information Technology 1,32 17,72 39,70 1,09 28481,01 
Emerson Electric Co. EMR Industrials 1,33 4,49 21,50 3,15 39937,86 
Capital One Financial Corporation COF Financials 1,51 0,88 11,17 1,85 41655,32 
Illinois Tool Works Inc. ITW Industrials 1,28 7,48 18,93 2,11 39868,51 
Halliburton Company HAL Energy 1,40 3,58 54,36 1,49 40867,48 
Ford Motor Company F Consumer Discretionary 1,24 1,96 10,64 4,12 54006,98 
Praxair Inc. PX Materials 1,04 6,62 22,57 2,30 36197,08 
Cognizant Technology Solutions 
Corporation Class A CTSH Information Technology 0,87 3,80 23,16 0,19 34906,78 
Southern Company SO Utilities 0,07 2,00 29,39 4,70 43593,78 
Norfolk Southern Corporation NSC Industrials 1,61 2,27 17,28 2,36 30649,93 
Express Scripts Holding Company ESRX Health Care 1,10 2,61 23,33 0,00 49849,27 
BB&T Corporation BBT Financials 1,14 1,27 15,51 2,73 30765,06 
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Cigna Corporation CI Health Care 0,82 2,67 17,37 0,03 33514,08 
Prudential Financial Inc. PRU Financials 1,43 1,43 22,73 2,87 39726,93 
Crown Castle International Corp CCI Real Estate 0,35 4,24 116,77 3,08 30730,13 
Boston Scientific Corporation BSX Health Care 0,71 3,86 102,83 0,00 25870,88 
Marsh & McLennan Companies 
Inc. MMC Financials 0,90 4,62 20,80 2,07 32319,90 
Dominion Energy Inc D Utilities 0,24 3,19 37,28 3,78 43468,91 
Intercontinental Exchange Inc. ICE Financials 0,58 1,99 30,45 1,28 28740,65 
Marriott International Inc. Class A MAR Consumer Discretionary 1,32 8,58 28,01 1,33 25380,93 
Zoetis Inc. Class A ZTS Health Care 0,80 17,35 39,52 0,77 23273,64 
Twenty-First Century Fox Inc. 
Class A FOXA Consumer Discretionary 1,38 3,89 16,42 1,05 38993,36 
Humana Inc. HUM Health Care 0,47 2,53 21,28 0,78 25876,91 
Electronic Arts Inc. EA Information Technology 0,74 5,53 84,96 0,00 20926,48 
Vertex Pharmaceuticals 
Incorporated VRTX Health Care 1,16 20,56 173,66 0,00 26371,78 
Illumina Inc. ILMN Health Care 0,56 12,15 73,52 0,00 23919,74 
Exelon Corporation EXC Utilities 0,41 1,20 17,56 3,76 30640,47 
Target Corporation TGT Consumer Discretionary 1,01 3,14 16,59 3,25 40898,09 
Ecolab Inc. ECL Materials 0,87 4,71 31,80 1,13 34152,39 
LyondellBasell Industries NV LYB Materials 1,46 4,98 13,28 3,45 41063,21 
Marathon Petroleum Corporation MPC Energy 1,42 2,00 14,97 2,53 25991,77 
State Street Corporation STT Financials 1,18 1,57 15,67 1,82 30427,99 
Constellation Brands Inc. Class A STZ Consumer Staples 0,17 3,85 25,62 0,62 23218,46 
Kimberly-Clark Corporation KMB Consumer Staples 0,78 49,95 28,74 3,12 42050,08 
HP Inc. HPQ Information Technology 1,72 2,07 11,30 2,71 42590,44 
Progressive Corporation PGR Financials 0,62 2,93 16,69 2,03 20075,23 
Air Products and Chemicals Inc. APD Materials 1,06 3,69 31,72 2,47 29567,77 
Baxter International Inc. BAX Health Care 0,59 3,57 17,75 1,88 32356,18 
Travelers Companies Inc. TRV Financials 0,97 1,41 11,42 2,29 33231,91 
Aflac Incorporated AFL Financials 0,84 1,84 10,70 2,38 29004,66 
Anadarko Petroleum Corporation APC Energy 1,67 2,58 53,18 0,88 36951,30 
eBay Inc. EBAY Information Technology 0,96 3,81 106,97 0,00 49442,78 
Aon plc AON Financials 0,98 4,93 22,09 1,11 28239,53 
Delta Air Lines Inc. DAL Industrials 1,18 2,82 12,73 1,35 33192,98 
Analog Devices Inc. ADI Information Technology 1,41 3,30 37,87 2,61 21027,04 
Eaton Corp. Plc ETN Industrials 1,47 1,96 16,83 3,16 31818,12 
Fidelity National Information 
Services Inc. FIS Information Technology 0,69 2,45 37,69 1,55 21554,19 
Prologis Inc. PLD Real Estate 0,91 1,68 72,51 3,26 24601,42 
Allstate Corporation ALL Financials 0,99 1,45 13,28 1,85 27433,60 
Estee Lauder Companies Inc. 
Class A EL Consumer Staples 0,71 8,38 29,74 1,23 20256,22 
Waste Management Inc. WM Industrials 0,55 4,58 56,52 2,84 26298,25 
Lam Research Corporation LRCX Information Technology 1,23 2,63 30,79 1,03 16050,60 
American Electric Power 
Company Inc. AEP Utilities 0,30 1,67 23,19 3,74 29246,07 
Pioneer Natural Resources 
Company PXD Energy 1,37 2,86 97,72 0,06 25959,78 
SunTrust Banks Inc. STI Financials 1,39 1,02 13,65 2,06 23035,99 
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Johnson Controls International 
plc JCI Industrials 0,91 2,75 36,34 2,10 24395,03 
Ross Stores Inc. ROST Consumer Discretionary 0,72 8,06 21,20 0,97 21261,67 
Sherwin-Williams Company SHW Materials 0,88 16,27 27,89 1,04 26004,99 
Sysco Corporation SYY Consumer Staples 0,51 7,72 27,16 2,85 25073,33 
Public Storage PSA Real Estate 0,44 6,88 35,20 3,34 34771,17 
Equinix Inc. EQIX Real Estate 0,57 5,06 195,39 1,40 20092,48 
Autodesk Inc. ADSK Information Technology 1,22 9,57 84,64 0,00 15609,74 
Kinder Morgan Inc Class P KMI Energy 1,31 1,86 117,84 4,02 48191,49 
Fiserv Inc. FISV Information Technology 0,81 7,19 27,39 0,00 20620,49 
McKesson Corporation MCK Health Care 1,21 4,18 22,54 0,65 38721,02 
Red Hat Inc. RHT Information Technology 1,01 10,35 67,76 0,00 14382,61 
T. Rowe Price Group TROW Financials 1,34 3,87 17,59 2,56 20302,92 
Roper Technologies Inc. ROP Industrials 1,06 3,26 28,55 0,61 18368,84 
Moody's Corporation MCO Financials 1,20 43,58 31,08 1,33 20810,02 
Edwards Lifesciences Corporation EW Health Care 0,51 6,59 30,12 0,00 16900,69 
DXC Technology Co. DXC Information Technology 0,72 2,57 112,62 1,26 12067,53 
Yum! Brands Inc. YUM Consumer Discretionary 0,83 25,32 25,77 2,01 30778,21 
Southwest Airlines Co. LUV Industrials 0,98 3,04 18,64 0,83 25463,05 
Weyerhaeuser Company WY Real Estate 1,54 2,92 34,35 3,57 20549,25 
Discover Financial Services DFS Financials 1,44 2,31 11,42 1,84 25174,98 
ONEOK Inc. OKE Energy 1,34 19,88 35,17 5,02 12435,66 
M&T Bank Corporation MTB Financials 1,17 1,44 16,74 2,20 19276,02 
V.F. Corporation VFC Consumer Discretionary 0,82 5,50 24,34 2,21 26639,02 
Sempra Energy SRE Utilities 0,27 2,12 22,04 2,84 25657,38 
Amphenol Corporation Class A APH Information Technology 0,83 5,34 24,70 0,93 18494,18 
PPG Industries Inc. PPG Materials 1,31 5,23 18,97 1,45 27429,30 
Alexion Pharmaceuticals Inc. ALXN Health Care 1,64 5,68 106,02 0,00 30419,12 
Aptiv PLC APTV Consumer Discretionary 1,71 7,55 16,80 1,38 21031,36 
Public Service Enterprise Group 
Inc PEG Utilities 0,44 1,63 20,68 3,84 21142,21 
Carnival Corporation CCL.U Consumer Discretionary 0,62 1,55 21,98 2,59 27943,46 
Western Digital Corporation WDC Information Technology 1,02 2,01 22,57 2,43 19946,99 
Archer-Daniels-Midland Company ADM Consumer Staples 1,13 1,39 17,97 2,59 26150,28 
Dollar General Corporation DG Consumer Discretionary 0,68 3,65 19,25 0,80 21089,65 
General Mills Inc. GIS Consumer Staples 0,73 6,68 21,50 3,22 33097,91 
Corning Inc GLW Information Technology 1,43 1,45 16,13 2,31 24968,73 
Consolidated Edison Inc. ED Utilities 0,02 1,49 17,21 3,92 20468,90 
Parker-Hannifin Corporation PH Industrials 1,42 3,37 19,23 1,87 18174,45 
Freeport-McMoRan Inc. FCX Materials 3,50 2,32 16,77 2,21 23018,15 
Cummins Inc. CMI Industrials 1,22 3,24 16,23 2,63 24098,45 
Rockwell Automation Inc. ROK Industrials 1,25 6,92 21,87 2,17 17063,09 
Northern Trust Corporation NTRS Financials 1,22 1,98 19,96 1,96 17253,54 
O'Reilly Automotive Inc. ORLY Consumer Discretionary 0,78 16,36 24,97 0,00 20512,10 
PACCAR Inc PCAR Industrials 1,32 3,04 20,57 1,51 21681,21 
Ingersoll-Rand Plc IR Industrials 1,47 1,45 32,77 1,82 18259,83 
Align Technology Inc. ALGN Health Care 1,54 8,05 54,92 0,00 7897,93 
Zimmer Biomet Holdings Inc. ZBH Health Care 0,77 2,28 53,10 0,85 20375,09 
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Regeneron Pharmaceuticals Inc. REGN Health Care 1,10 11,02 74,79 0,00 39371,00 
Xcel Energy Inc. XEL Utilities 0,18 1,77 18,42 3,51 19083,18 
International Paper Company IP Materials 1,69 4,06 23,21 3,36 20742,54 
Fifth Third Bancorp FITB Financials 1,40 1,17 11,37 2,46 17522,44 
Equity Residential EQR Real Estate 0,47 2,33 25,01 3,16 23948,80 
Williams Companies Inc. WMB Energy 1,47 4,01 73,63 5,36 27064,68 
Dollar Tree Inc. DLTR Consumer Discretionary 0,55 5,01 28,82 0,00 16775,04 
PG&E Corporation PCG Utilities 0,18 1,53 23,81 3,21 25886,47 
Rockwell Collins Inc. COL Industrials 0,90 4,86 19,01 1,42 13247,27 
Stanley Black & Decker Inc. SWK Industrials 1,04 2,56 21,27 2,06 17097,21 
Microchip Technology 
Incorporated MCHP Information Technology 0,92 4,73 57,09 2,70 12363,00 
Dr Pepper Snapple Group Inc. DPS Consumer Staples 0,40 6,45 20,20 2,55 14914,68 
AvalonBay Communities Inc. AVB Real Estate 0,42 2,27 56,30 3,13 21996,88 
Kroger Co. KR Consumer Staples 1,23 4,28 17,12 1,50 27648,18 
Devon Energy Corporation DVN Energy 2,36 2,22 24,04 1,24 21901,45 
Digital Realty Trust Inc. DLR Real Estate 0,45 2,95 63,43 4,51 12811,87 
KeyCorp KEY Financials 1,45 1,19 14,87 2,08 14206,21 
Centene Corporation CNC Health Care 0,64 2,56 24,97 0,00 9146,67 
Regions Financial Corporation RF Financials 1,47 0,92 13,75 1,95 14773,04 
Ameriprise Financial Inc. AMP Financials 1,47 2,82 14,85 2,33 20144,32 
Newmont Mining Corporation NEM Materials 0,85 1,43 155,63 1,09 15162,29 
Paychex Inc. PAYX Information Technology 1,00 9,92 26,68 3,26 18721,10 
Concho Resources Inc. CXO Energy 1,32 2,35 49,71 0,00 15433,24 
Willis Towers Watson Public 
Limited Company WLTW Financials 0,77 2,81 30,93 2,16 12921,52 
Welltower Inc. WELL Real Estate 0,38 1,79 112,47 5,01 22768,17 
Andeavor ANDV Energy 1,36 1,76 15,06 2,11 10801,28 
Tyson Foods Inc. Class A TSN Consumer Staples 0,77 1,98 15,91 1,06 15316,14 
Agilent Technologies Inc. A Health Care 1,13 3,51 31,45 0,99 16693,17 
Monster Beverage Corporation MNST Consumer Staples 0,61 8,01 42,60 0,00 23232,50 
Nucor Corporation NUE Materials 1,46 2,11 27,52 2,95 16469,00 
Edison International EIX Utilities 0,23 1,83 33,11 2,83 20823,32 
Mylan N.V. MYL Health Care 1,11 3,17 31,10 0,00 21068,10 
WEC Energy Group Inc WEC Utilities 0,17 2,11 20,08 3,44 15178,12 
PPL Corporation PPL Utilities 0,50 2,06 18,88 4,52 22543,12 
Hartford Financial Services Group 
Inc. HIG Financials 1,08 1,16 25,64 1,82 17353,45 
Ventas Inc. VTR Real Estate 0,29 2,12 44,46 4,69 20898,85 
SBA Communications Corp. Class 
A SBAC Real Estate 0,67 28,71 230,67 0,00 14211,05 
Cerner Corporation CERN Health Care 0,96 5,12 39,79 0,00 20281,85 
Harris Corporation HRS Industrials 0,73 3,90 35,63 2,28 10597,10 
NetApp Inc. NTAP Information Technology 1,21 3,65 28,32 1,94 11657,59 
Skyworks Solutions Inc. SWKS Information Technology 0,94 3,95 21,14 0,85 13613,55 
Boston Properties Inc. BXP Real Estate 0,77 3,34 39,97 2,25 18786,59 
Royal Caribbean Cruises Ltd. RCL Consumer Discretionary 0,84 1,88 40,22 1,86 17434,70 
DTE Energy Company DTE Utilities 0,27 1,76 18,86 3,45 15612,51 
Best Buy Co. Inc. BBY Consumer Discretionary 1,15 3,08 13,69 2,55 13243,15 
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Global Payments Inc. GPN Information Technology 1,11 4,62 33,50 0,08 9196,81 
Marathon Oil Corporation MRO Energy 2,59 0,99 12,25 2,33 16842,31 
Motorola Solutions Inc. MSI Information Technology 0,59 4,79 20,56 2,13 14504,15 
E*TRADE Financial Corporation ETFC Financials 1,52 1,41 28,64 0,00 8269,34 
CenturyLink Inc. CTL 
Telecommunication 
Services 1,20 1,14 23,84 7,99 17372,73 
Textron Inc. TXT Industrials 1,26 2,27 18,74 0,20 11523,69 
Noble Energy Inc. NBL Energy 1,60 1,87 22,84 1,30 17951,68 
IDEXX Laboratories Inc. IDXX Health Care 0,62 35,16 43,48 0,00 9017,36 
KLA-Tencor Corporation KLAC Information Technology 1,34 12,78 19,69 2,83 12140,21 
Eversource Energy ES Utilities 0,42 1,58 19,16 3,29 16567,03 
Laboratory Corporation of 
America Holdings LH Health Care 0,49 2,64 20,80 0,00 12190,73 
Xilinx Inc. XLNX Information Technology 0,75 5,22 23,37 2,45 13286,85 
AMETEK Inc. AME Industrials 1,13 3,70 23,80 0,65 12922,31 
CBS Corporation Class B CBS Consumer Discretionary 1,23 6,56 21,85 1,09 25252,14 
Comerica Incorporated CMA Financials 1,65 1,27 17,64 1,69 9817,52 
United Continental Holdings Inc. UAL Industrials 1,22 3,50 13,41 0,00 18783,27 
SVB Financial Group SIVB Financials 1,71 2,22 21,92 0,00 7151,49 
Seagate Technology PLC STX Information Technology 1,39 7,21 16,41 5,27 14333,21 
Omnicom Group Inc OMC Consumer Discretionary 1,01 6,92 17,30 2,71 18196,91 
Huntington Bancshares 
Incorporated HBAN Financials 1,46 1,37 14,75 2,50 10257,43 
Vulcan Materials Company VMC Materials 1,21 2,70 98,17 0,52 12333,45 
Verisk Analytics Inc VRSK Industrials 0,81 17,56 28,77 0,00 12599,12 
Hess Corporation HES Energy 2,19 1,15 186,66 1,63 19810,32 
Cardinal Health Inc. CAH Health Care 0,95 3,63 28,65 2,18 23968,01 
MGM Resorts International MGM Consumer Discretionary 0,92 2,39 42,23 0,37 13418,97 
W.W. Grainger Inc. GWW Industrials 0,92 6,48 21,94 2,00 14883,34 
Host Hotels & Resorts Inc. HST Real Estate 1,29 1,99 36,23 3,92 14151,70 
National Oilwell Varco Inc. NOV Energy 0,90 1,14 11,95 1,96 20528,80 
Kellogg Company K Consumer Staples 0,44 10,31 32,78 2,95 23992,10 
Eastman Chemical Company EMN Materials 1,22 2,74 14,09 2,06 11769,93 
Apache Corporation APA Energy 1,54 3,22 18,35 1,74 23713,26 
Republic Services Inc. RSG Industrials 0,58 2,08 26,04 2,59 16440,12 
Principal Financial Group Inc. PFG Financials 1,42 1,48 36,44 2,92 15236,38 
Wynn Resorts Limited WYNN Consumer Discretionary 1,53 33,56 36,21 2,36 13965,58 
Cintas Corporation CTAS Industrials 0,85 4,87 23,52 1,13 10614,95 
Waters Corporation WAT Health Care 0,76 5,30 23,55 0,00 11205,64 
L3 Technologies Inc LLL Industrials 0,99 2,20 22,21 2,00 11089,99 
Brown-Forman Corporation Class 
B BF.B Consumer Staples 0,86 12,23 29,02 1,32 11522,03 
Conagra Brands Inc. CAG Consumer Staples 0,46 3,70 25,11 2,58 15903,47 
Essex Property Trust Inc. ESS Real Estate 0,47 2,45 55,21 2,83 13059,90 
Clorox Company CLX Consumer Staples 0,38 61,29 24,18 2,79 14739,00 
Lincoln National Corporation LNC Financials 1,96 1,03 11,28 1,64 13469,25 
Baker Hughes a GE Company 
Class A BHGE Energy 1,27 5,87 30,21 1,38 22524,25 
Fastenal Company FAST Industrials 0,93 6,92 27,17 2,53 13361,94 
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FirstEnergy Corp. FE Utilities 0,29 2,09 42,51 4,57 14459,29 
XL Group Ltd XL Financials 0,37 1,03 18,17 2,02 10063,49 
Realty Income Corporation O Real Estate 0,48 2,10 48,36 4,63 12628,76 
IQVIA Holdings Inc IQV Health Care 0,60 2,20 44,61 0,00 11559,79 
Mettler-Toledo International Inc. MTD Health Care 1,22 17,79 29,67 0,00 10209,95 
Ulta Beauty Inc ULTA Consumer Discretionary 0,44 7,49 36,13 0,00 11151,78 
American Water Works Company 
Inc. AWK Utilities 0,25 2,18 25,13 2,28 11206,70 
MSCI Inc. Class A MSCI Financials 0,74 14,40 30,55 0,91 7483,74 
ResMed Inc. RMD Health Care 0,43 4,95 25,84 1,91 8869,47 
Expedia Group Inc. EXPE Consumer Discretionary 1,20 4,24 47,50 0,87 13275,00 
Total System Services Inc. TSS Information Technology 1,12 4,38 26,46 0,98 8783,09 
CBRE Group Inc. Class A CBRE Real Estate 1,60 3,84 22,04 0,00 10941,41 
Entergy Corporation ETR Utilities 0,40 1,52 18,93 4,60 13345,81 
D.R. Horton Inc. DHI Consumer Discretionary 0,97 1,70 14,94 0,99 10797,92 
Ameren Corporation AEE Utilities 0,33 1,62 19,81 3,72 11268,90 
United Rentals Inc. URI Industrials 2,19 4,29 20,20 0,00 8762,10 
AmerisourceBergen Corporation ABC Health Care 1,18 13,34 116,13 1,47 18633,64 
Lennar Corporation Class A LEN Consumer Discretionary 1,15 1,68 15,57 0,35 8892,48 
ANSYS Inc. ANSS Information Technology 0,81 3,89 35,26 0,00 8722,24 
Citrix Systems Inc. CTXS Information Technology 1,11 6,89 35,77 0,00 11982,43 
Quest Diagnostics Incorporated DGX Health Care 0,52 2,34 17,24 2,03 10930,78 
Martin Marietta Materials Inc. MLM Materials 1,24 2,57 40,18 1,09 9943,02 
Loews Corporation L Financials 0,85 0,84 62,02 0,58 15641,35 
Equifax Inc. EFX Industrials 0,85 4,62 29,26 1,24 12105,11 
Genuine Parts Company GPC Consumer Discretionary 1,13 4,12 19,87 2,77 13601,49 
Ball Corporation BLL Materials 0,74 5,56 33,13 0,84 10575,37 
Akamai Technologies Inc. AKAM Information Technology 1,26 3,33 35,16 0,00 10344,36 
Mohawk Industries Inc. MHK Consumer Discretionary 0,97 2,49 23,67 0,00 13769,16 
Synopsys Inc. SNPS Information Technology 0,99 2,64 37,78 0,00 8322,38 
Expeditors International of 
Washington Inc. EXPD Industrials 0,77 4,81 23,58 1,47 9284,59 
Raymond James Financial Inc. RJF Financials 1,58 1,81 17,82 1,28 8782,26 
Symantec Corporation SYMC Information Technology 0,38 3,70 17,45 2,06 15934,35 
Nektar Therapeutics NKTR Health Care 1,08 103,01 138,82 0,00 3175,60 
Xylem Inc. XYL Industrials 1,28 3,51 27,23 1,40 8016,09 
GGP Inc. GGP Real Estate 0,82 2,81 36,23 3,01 22017,41 
Tiffany & Co. TIF Consumer Discretionary 1,50 3,69 30,96 1,95 10990,87 
Hershey Company HSY Consumer Staples 0,68 20,59 32,73 2,31 15397,03 
Take-Two Interactive Software 
Inc. TTWO Information Technology 1,11 4,66 268,87 0,00 4503,17 
CMS Energy Corporation CMS Utilities 0,22 2,55 20,10 3,26 10371,04 
PVH Corp. PVH Consumer Discretionary 0,62 1,93 25,45 0,14 9201,97 
Alexandria Real Estate Equities 
Inc. ARE Real Estate 0,91 1,79 84,77 3,34 7723,89 
Tapestry Inc. TPR Consumer Discretionary 0,92 4,36 20,19 3,33 11700,19 
Dover Corporation DOV Industrials 1,35 3,07 18,40 2,14 12752,16 
CarMax Inc. KMX Consumer Discretionary 1,53 3,55 20,67 0,00 11492,68 
EQT Corporation EQT Energy 0,58 2,20 83,97 0,17 12366,00 
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J. M. Smucker Company SJM Consumer Staples 0,51 2,00 22,38 2,59 13076,18 
C.H. Robinson Worldwide Inc. CHRW Industrials 0,61 8,41 21,18 2,32 10143,90 
McCormick & Company 
Incorporated MKC Consumer Staples 0,44 5,67 24,60 1,97 10020,41 
Arthur J. Gallagher & Co. AJG Financials 0,92 2,49 23,50 3,02 8404,29 
Newell Brands Inc NWL Consumer Discretionary 0,62 3,37 30,82 2,06 14166,80 
Cadence Design Systems Inc. CDNS Information Technology 1,13 6,75 37,03 0,00 6956,02 
Gartner Inc. IT Information Technology 0,95 46,85 50,18 0,00 7945,63 
Masco Corporation MAS Industrials 1,05 10,52 27,39 1,30 9817,02 
Kansas City Southern KSU Industrials 1,18 2,75 24,71 1,25 10945,79 
Church & Dwight Co. Inc. CHD Consumer Staples 0,57 5,15 26,99 1,64 10973,94 
Extra Space Storage Inc. EXR Real Estate 0,43 4,06 36,31 3,49 8507,73 
Incyte Corporation INCY Health Care 1,31 49,63 706,77 0,00 15570,97 
Zions Bancorporation ZION Financials 1,36 1,02 20,29 0,84 6742,47 
Cboe Global Markets Inc CBOE Financials 0,67 13,77 33,47 1,32 6647,24 
FMC Corporation FMC Materials 1,30 4,37 84,02 1,07 8477,85 
Vornado Realty Trust VNO Real Estate 0,91 3,55 41,89 2,93 17601,23 
Invesco Ltd. IVZ Financials 1,43 1,71 16,30 3,14 14382,88 
Packaging Corporation of America PKG Materials 1,36 4,30 18,13 2,76 7582,67 
Molson Coors Brewing Company 
Class B TAP Consumer Staples 0,81 1,61 20,06 2,05 14036,03 
Kohl's Corporation KSS Consumer Discretionary 1,14 1,72 13,64 3,72 10011,90 
Whirlpool Corporation WHR Consumer Discretionary 1,34 2,67 17,31 2,16 12572,87 
F5 Networks Inc. FFIV Information Technology 1,05 6,19 24,88 0,00 8136,29 
Henry Schein Inc. HSIC Health Care 1,14 4,07 24,99 0,00 11694,89 
Franklin Resources Inc. BEN Financials 1,58 2,27 14,77 1,51 27255,47 
CA Inc. CA Information Technology 0,95 2,34 17,20 3,24 13501,31 
Varian Medical Systems Inc. VAR Health Care 0,85 5,26 24,27 0,00 8699,23 
J.B. Hunt Transport Services Inc. JBHT Industrials 1,11 7,00 24,47 0,97 9802,99 
Norwegian Cruise Line Holdings 
Ltd. NCLH Consumer Discretionary 1,11 2,46 31,51 0,00 10156,86 
CenterPoint Energy Inc. CNP Utilities 0,54 2,49 25,23 4,25 10258,79 
Cooper Companies Inc. COO Health Care 0,66 2,97 30,82 0,04 8376,88 
Chipotle Mexican Grill Inc. CMG Consumer Discretionary 1,08 8,66 84,01 0,00 14820,27 
Hologic Inc. HOLX Health Care 0,70 3,98 82,96 0,00 9253,01 
Darden Restaurants Inc. DRI Consumer Discretionary 0,45 3,94 19,71 3,51 8397,72 
Nasdaq Inc. NDAQ Financials 0,87 1,65 31,84 1,73 9469,20 
Advanced Micro Devices Inc. AMD Information Technology 1,96 14,31 48,56 0,00 5457,34 
DENTSPLY SIRONA Inc. XRAY Health Care 0,95 2,43 26,17 0,56 10016,00 
HCP Inc. HCP Real Estate 0,29 2,18 45,42 5,58 16613,74 
Cabot Oil & Gas Corporation COG Energy 0,72 5,34 100,60 0,41 12216,40 
NRG Energy Inc. NRG Utilities 1,16 1,63 150,70 1,63 7415,07 
Cincinnati Financial Corporation CINF Financials 0,82 1,94 18,06 3,14 9989,28 
Albemarle Corporation ALB Materials 1,30 2,88 25,79 1,62 7988,62 
Macy's Inc M Consumer Discretionary 0,79 2,86 13,66 3,58 14952,21 
Huntington Ingalls Industries Inc. HII Industrials 0,82 4,19 17,72 1,14 6821,77 
Michael Kors Holdings Ltd KORS Consumer Discretionary 0,86 5,53 18,16 0,00 11084,47 
Alliance Data Systems 
Corporation ADS Information Technology 1,33 8,20 29,65 0,30 13866,87 
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Qorvo Inc. QRVO Information Technology 1,67 1,70 216,54 0,00 6549,20 
BorgWarner Inc. BWA Consumer Discretionary 1,84 2,97 26,57 1,13 10700,39 
Universal Health Services Inc. 
Class B UHS Health Care 0,36 2,48 17,79 0,32 9890,66 
Mid-America Apartment 
Communities Inc. MAA Real Estate 0,30 1,80 51,70 3,83 7312,53 
Nielsen Holdings Plc NLSN Industrials 0,78 3,45 32,39 2,63 15787,63 
Hasbro Inc. HAS Consumer Discretionary 0,84 5,34 21,15 2,73 9275,46 
DaVita Inc. DVA Health Care 0,87 2,89 27,71 0,00 14151,41 
Perrigo Co. Plc PRGO Health Care 0,48 2,28 80,04 0,50 16671,90 
Duke Realty Corporation DRE Real Estate 0,82 2,21 59,40 3,39 7588,84 
International Flavors & 
Fragrances Inc. IFF Materials 0,79 5,75 23,90 1,85 9240,78 
Tractor Supply Company TSCO Consumer Discretionary 1,13 7,10 26,70 1,13 9861,91 
Mosaic Company MOS Materials 1,56 1,32 27,25 2,58 12299,28 
Viacom Inc. Class B VIAB Consumer Discretionary 1,58 5,30 11,14 2,37 20233,27 
Avery Dennison Corporation AVY Materials 1,02 5,92 22,10 2,32 6214,96 
Torchmark Corporation TMK Financials 0,91 1,57 13,89 0,88 7718,44 
CF Industries Holdings Inc. CF Materials 1,37 2,52 18,05 2,79 10294,84 
IPG Photonics Corporation IPGP Information Technology 1,27 3,80 23,79 0,00 5689,78 
A. O. Smith Corporation AOS Industrials 1,44 4,51 794,12 1,11 5869,35 
Hormel Foods Corporation HRL Consumer Staples 0,41 3,80 23,86 1,77 16173,98 
Juniper Networks Inc. JNPR Information Technology 1,17 1,98 21,86 1,29 10287,24 
Iron Mountain Inc. IRM Real Estate 1,22 7,02 56,05 5,38 7644,96 
UDR Inc. UDR Real Estate 0,54 3,03 140,72 3,45 8539,70 
Western Union Company WU Information Technology 1,00 8,18 19,23 3,23 9458,70 
Affiliated Managers Group Inc. AMG Financials 1,57 3,40 24,80 0,13 9853,90 
Alliant Energy Corp LNT Utilities 0,35 2,02 19,84 3,37 7653,30 
Everest Re Group Ltd. RE Financials 0,65 1,27 10,51 2,10 8469,11 
Interpublic Group of Companies 
Inc. IPG Consumer Discretionary 0,90 3,93 19,44 2,51 8428,44 
LKQ Corporation LKQ Consumer Discretionary 0,94 2,91 24,07 0,00 9399,07 
Advance Auto Parts Inc. AAP Consumer Discretionary 0,91 3,97 22,66 0,19 9820,12 
Cimarex Energy Co. XEC Energy 1,55 3,49 21,65 0,47 10121,77 
L Brands Inc. LB Consumer Discretionary 0,81 1066,91 19,13 3,21 18978,26 
Snap-on Incorporated SNA Industrials 1,09 3,26 18,50 1,63 8278,89 
SL Green Realty Corp. SLG Real Estate 0,92 1,54 71,77 2,40 10253,96 
Fortune Brands Home & Security 
Inc. FBHS Industrials 1,22 3,29 33,06 1,15 8145,28 
Pinnacle West Capital 
Corporation PNW Utilities 0,34 1,64 17,81 3,63 7667,47 
Federal Realty Investment Trust FRT Real Estate 0,50 5,13 49,27 2,80 9063,18 
NiSource Inc NI Utilities 0,45 1,80 26,28 2,87 9385,52 
Regency Centers Corporation REG Real Estate 0,61 2,88 227,69 3,22 7150,52 
Robert Half International Inc. RHI Industrials 1,00 6,03 20,72 1,76 6310,03 
PulteGroup Inc. PHM Consumer Discretionary 1,00 1,56 13,06 1,42 7328,85 
PerkinElmer Inc. PKI Health Care 0,92 2,63 31,81 0,56 5838,34 
AES Corporation AES Utilities 0,97 2,63 35,23 3,09 8521,38 
Arconic Inc. ARNC Industrials 1,93 1,70 86,94 1,10 12942,18 
Ralph Lauren Corporation Class A RL Consumer Discretionary 1,14 2,84 31,50 1,67 7403,67 
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Sealed Air Corporation SEE Materials 1,25 22,05 34,15 1,42 8199,94 
Jacobs Engineering Group Inc. JEC Industrials 1,15 1,50 22,74 0,29 6736,69 
Jefferies Financial Group Inc JEF Financials 1,27 0,81 44,67 1,20 8513,94 
Pentair plc PNR Industrials 1,26 2,49 54,01 1,98 11822,33 
Helmerich & Payne Inc. HP Energy 1,39 1,66 16,53 3,98 7562,49 
FLIR Systems Inc. FLIR Information Technology 0,80 2,81 25,00 1,38 4813,01 
Harley-Davidson Inc. HOG Consumer Discretionary 0,95 4,82 15,76 2,30 11090,83 
Gap Inc. GPS Consumer Discretionary 0,88 4,59 13,78 2,91 13751,49 
Alaska Air Group Inc. ALK Industrials 0,77 2,92 12,46 1,30 8113,78 
Garmin Ltd. GRMN Consumer Discretionary 1,08 2,63 19,43 4,17 9362,03 
DISH Network Corporation Class 
A DISH Consumer Discretionary 1,19 9,90 31,47 0,00 12619,70 
Hanesbrands Inc. HBI Consumer Discretionary 0,78 8,56 23,15 1,80 9190,10 
Discovery Inc. Class A DISCA Consumer Discretionary 1,51 2,43 20,71 0,00 6117,01 
Fluor Corporation FLR Industrials 1,51 2,58 24,80 1,47 8584,64 
Campbell Soup Company CPB Consumer Staples 0,36 9,94 24,55 2,66 15330,88 
People's United Financial Inc. PBCT Financials 0,96 1,04 19,13 4,19 5186,31 
Goodyear Tire & Rubber 
Company GT Consumer Discretionary 1,56 2,14 13,86 1,03 7289,36 
Kimco Realty Corporation KIM Real Estate 0,55 1,90 32,28 4,47 9595,80 
Apartment Investment and 
Management Company Class A AIV Real Estate 0,65 4,31 165,49 3,23 5837,34 
Xerox Corporation XRX Information Technology 1,02 1,44 17,84 2,76 10954,52 
Macerich Company MAC Real Estate 0,76 2,40 45,23 3,95 10170,82 
H&R Block Inc. HRB Consumer Discretionary 0,52 105,95 19,64 3,02 7147,22 
Foot Locker Inc. FL Consumer Discretionary 0,76 2,81 14,99 2,03 7398,47 
Newfield Exploration Company NFX Energy 2,15 4,00 17,06 0,00 5641,20 
Nordstrom Inc. JWN Consumer Discretionary 0,90 8,54 18,80 2,55 10586,04 
Leggett & Platt Incorporated LEG Consumer Discretionary 1,01 4,98 28,35 3,13 5782,08 
Flowserve Corporation FLS Industrials 1,56 4,05 27,78 1,37 7240,12 
TripAdvisor Inc. TRIP Consumer Discretionary 1,35 7,79 62,12 0,00 8680,69 
Assurant Inc. AIZ Financials 0,48 1,20 15,61 2,04 4901,85 
Quanta Services Inc. PWR Industrials 1,23 1,40 20,82 0,00 5455,84 
Stericycle Inc. SRCL Industrials 0,37 3,78 35,35 0,00 8856,35 
Acuity Brands Inc. AYI Industrials 1,20 4,87 33,42 0,34 7311,68 
Mattel Inc. MAT Consumer Discretionary 1,02 4,38 22,83 5,09 9970,21 
Envision Healthcare Corp. EVHC Health Care 0,15 1,37 30,29 0,00 3685,71 
SCANA Corporation SCG Utilities 0,41 1,53 14,59 4,11 8028,94 
Under Armour Inc. Class A UAA Consumer Discretionary 1,38 7,78 64,05 0,00 8580,49 
Range Resources Corporation RRC Energy 0,75 2,54 74,03 0,32 8432,14 
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Appendix 2. Deleted observations due to missing variables.  
S&P 500 stocks excluded from the regression analyses due to missing data on some or all variables or having 
continuously negative P/B ratios. N = 25.  
 
 
 
Company Identifier Sector Beta P/B P/E DY MV
DowDuPont Inc. DWDP Materials 0,24 6,00 0,25 23998,75
PayPal Holdings Inc PYPL Information Technology 2,25 42,43 0,00 34562,55
Kraft Heinz Company KHC Consumer Staples 0,91 63,18 1,74 55810,67
Synchrony Financial SYF Financials 1,90 11,64 0,66 19250,55
Hewlett Packard Enterprise Co. HPE Information Technology 0,98 37,35 0,75 15750,85
Fortive Corp. FTV Industrials 6,32 24,23 0,16 8577,63
Hilton Worldwide Holdings Inc HLT Consumer Discretionary 6,39 74,03 0,59 20740,27
Citizens Financial Group Inc. CFG Financials 0,58 15,97 1,26 11419,60
American Airlines Group Inc. AAL Industrials 6,43 8,25 0,71 22547,39
IHS Markit Ltd. INFO Industrials 1,67 54,40 0,00 8647,56
WestRock Co. WRK Materials 1,27 48,29 1,77 7882,89
TechnipFMC Plc FTI Energy 0,29 0,00 0,19 3889,57
Allegion PLC ALLE Industrials 91,05 63,36 0,61 5655,05
News Corporation Class A NWSA Consumer Discretionary 0,74 33,01 0,83 5564,59
Brighthouse Financial Inc. BHF Financials 0,10 0,00 0,00 1216,36
Navient Corp NAVI Financials 1,05 10,34 3,47 4324,02
Coty Inc. Class A COTY Consumer Staples 8,64 57,66 1,50 5737,15
Philip Morris International Inc. PM Consumer Staples 0,70 19,80 4,36 145198,33
HCA Healthcare Inc HCA Health Care 0,35 14,65 0,09 28513,20
AutoZone Inc. AZO Consumer Discretionary 0,64 17,76 0,00 19214,76
TransDigm Group Incorporated TDG Industrials 0,39 45,85 0,00 11866,15
VeriSign Inc. VRSN Information Technology 0,74 25,01 0,00 8579,04
Unum Group UNM Financials 1,25 0,00 12,78 1,96 9124,95
Wyndham Worldwide Corporation WYN Consumer Discretionary 1,31 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
TE Connectivity Ltd. TEL Information Technology 1,18 2,72 0,00 1,97 25584,88
